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“I am concerned and I am frustrated because I don’t know what the alternates are…
It clearly isn’t racist; its economics. The real question you have to ask yourself is: Is this
good or bad?”
Norman Rice, former Mayor of Seattle
On gentrification in that city.2
Introduction and Scope
Urban America is in a state of crisis. A huge pool of America’s resources is
increasingly disconnected from mainstream society.3 That pool is within the core of
major cities and particularly includes African American and Hispanic male youth.4 By
way of illustration, more than half of all core city African American men do not finish
high school. The correlation between drop-out rates, unemployment, and incarceration is
profound. As of 2004, 72% of African American dropouts who are in their 20’s are
unemployed, up from 65% in 2000.5 Incarceration levels are at historic highs and
increasing, where by their mid-30’s, 6 in 10 of these high school drop outs have spent
time in prison.6 That rate is four times higher than that of Black men in South Africa
under the apartheid regime.7 Seventy five percent of African American males
incarcerated in Baltimore Maryland did not graduate from high school.8 The infant
mortality rate among all African Americans is more than twice the national average, and
is much worse among the poor in the core of urban America.9 After the Katrina
floodwaters have receded, some see an opportunity to buy low and sell high. But the
muted voices of the poor cry to keep what they had.10 For them it was a Katrina moment.
2 Blaine Harden, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/18/AR2006061800605)
(accessed June 19, 2006).
3 Andrew Sum, Challenges & Pol’y Options: Labor Market Conditions Among 16-24 Year-Old Young
Adults in Maryland and the Baltimore PMSA, Johns Hopkins University 2-3 (2001). The Sum study found
that Black and Hispanic youth in Baltimore, Maryland, are twice as likely to fall within the ethnographic
definition of “disconnected” than white youth. The term “disconnected” refers to a quantified tendency to
be out-of-school and out-of-work.
4 Id.
5 Eric Eckholm, Plight Deepens for Black Men, Studies Warn, N.Y. TIMES A1 (March 20, 2006). Eckholm
was relying on data from a panel of experts at Columbia, Princeton, and Harvard, who opined that the rate
of disconnectedness is “far” greater for these African American males than comparable white and Hispanic
men. One factor of many is the reduced market for unskilled labor.
6 Id.
7 Dash T. Douglas, A House Divided: The Social and Economic Underdevelopment of American’s Inner
Cities, 10 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 381 (Spring 1999), citing Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation
Report, The Millennium Breach 1(1998).
8 Sum, supra at n. 2. The findings were from 1998.
9 Center for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/omh/AMH/factsheets/infant.htm (accessed June 13,
2006). The national average is 6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births, but 14.1 among African Americans. That is
on par with the mortality of children from Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, see study involving the
World Health Organization and the World Bank (available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_289.html) (accessed June 13, 2006).
10 Query whether those core residents will experience economic discrimination through a Reverse
Reconstruction. The Civil War Reconstruction was designed to increase the quality of life for former slaves
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For the urban core poor across the nation, it has been a Katrina erosion over the decades
from a series of unnatural disasters.
Despite this crisis in urban America, could it be that over $2 billion of US
taxpayer dollars designed to alleviate that problem are being co-opted for the financially
well-healed? With the aid of federal subsidies, are the wealthy gentrifying the low
income areas and marginalizing the low income residents in the process? A long-time
Portland Oregon resident observed: “The heart of the black community is gone.”11
Seattle’s first and only African American mayor in the 1990’s observed the transition of
well-educated and mostly white newcomers into the city’s Central District and said: “I
am concerned and I am frustrated because I don’t know what the alternates are…It
clearly isn’t racist; its economics. The real question you have to ask yourself is: Is this
good or bad?”12 More to the point of this article, is the federal law, through the new
markets tax credit program actually subsidizing the gentrification?
The answer to the later question appears to be either an unequivocally “yes”, or
adding a drop of vacillation: “It certainly appears that way”. Metaphorically speaking,
the proof is in the plumbing. As will be detailed below the NMTC program has been used
to subsidize the development of performing arts centers for opera, ballet, symphony
orchestras, hotels, high priced condominiums, theatres, mixed use commercial
developments, and even convention centers.13 This author opines that as a matter of tax
credit policy, the needs of the desperate should trump the wants of financially well-
healed, and that the NMTC funds were not misappropriated, just misapplied in many
significant respects - a correctable error nonetheless.
The thesis of this article is designed to correct the error with a two-pronged, but
multi-faceted rationale. The intent is narrow the scope of governmental subsidies while
expanding the private sector equity through a community sense of personal responsibility.
Thesis prong one: If tax credits are used as part of the solution to urban ills, gentrified
projects are not consistent with Congressional intent or wise tax policy. The remedy is to
close loopholes so existing residents are intended beneficiaries and truly the object of the
tax subsidy project. Thesis prong two: The criteria used to close loopholes also provides
an increased opportunity for all properly purposed investors, including a reconfigured
substrata of the African American middle class. That subgroup has the resources and
peculiarly-crafted investment motivations aligned with self help investment techniques of
prior generations. I term them “Ethnivestors”. The use of Ethnivestors can be
accomplished through the race-neutral amendments proposed in this article. Through
these two components, the opportunity exists to increase efficiency of tax subsidies
(loophole closure) while also increasing private equity infusion from new sources
(Ethnivestors) for the long term benefit of urban core community, thereby reducing long
term governmental dependence by those communities.
Those assertions are built on the following premises:
1. America without a healthy urban America
and their decedents. It remains to be seen whether the well educated financially well healed will be the
beneficiaries of the Post Katrina reconstruction of New Orleans and other Gulf Coast communities.
11 Harden, supra n. 2.
12 Id. One in four of the anticipated job growth in the Seattle central city is high wage and highly skilled
positions.
13 See the discussion in Part II regarding what I term “Problematic Purposed Projects”.
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2. There is no healthy urban America without revitalizing the core of major cities
from the current blight and despair.
3. There is no effective revitalization if the urban core businesses and residents are
marginalized, perpetuating the social costs and wasting of a national resource of
incalculable proportions.
Tax credits are subsidies, and in an alarming number of cases, NMTCs are in
effect subsidization of gentrification, which in turn perpetuate the marginalization of low
income residents. The remedy in part lies in both (1) closing the statutory and regulatory
loopholes that allow subsidized gentrification, and (2) through proper modeling, establish
a private sector revitalization of the urban core beyond gentrification without material
marginalization of core residents. A reconfigured African American middle class should
on its own collective volition be part of the revitalization through a revitalization of its
own, fostering a reunion of sorts. While many initiatives exist to address the plight of
urban America, the vehicle on stage in this article is the New Markets Tax Credit.
Consistent with the two-pronged thesis, this article is organized in two Sections.
Section 1 addresses loophole closure within the existing NMTC statute and regulations.
Section 2 concerns the Ethnivestor-private sector alternative model to gentrified
subsidization. Each section has its component parts. Section 1 has a Part 1 that provides
an overview of the regulatory structure of the tax credit, foundational definitions and
intended operational scheme. This is to clarify that the intent of the legislation was to
benefit the low income residents, not wealthy residents who come into low income areas.
Part II provides a contextual framework for the competing models for how tax subsidies
should be delivered to the urban community, i.e. models that allow for gentrified projects
and those that do not. Part III contains proposed amendments to the legislation to close
loopholes that have diverted funds away from the low income residents of target
communities.
Section 2 provides contains a Part 1 that examines the historical development of
ethnic enclaves in the United States, and how ethnic entrepreneurship gave rise to an
ethnic enclave economy that can provide a valuable template for a modern day
Ethnivestor. I maintain the NMTC target communities are also ethnic enclaves. Part II
sets forth the conceptual precepts and then the Ethnivestor model, including various
characteristics and investment motivations that make an Ethnivestor well suited for a
NMTC transaction. Part III is the application of law and economic principles to further
explore whether the Ethnivestor model may lead to increased utility and efficiency for the
target residents and the Ethnivestor in a NMTC transaction beyond that of investor
groups not similarly engaged in “social entrepreneurship”.14 Finally, Part IV is the
application of the theoretical model to provide concrete illustrations of how the
Ethnivestor more efficiently meets the congressional purpose of assisting low income
residents without marginalizing them in the process. This discussion emphasizes the
14 This term is defined as the pursuit of innovative investment strategies, including profit-making ventures
to serve a social mission, typically found in the nonprofit sector or within private hybrid business
organizations mixing nonprofit and for-profit social purposes. This is called a “double bottom line”. Gail
A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating ‘Enterprise’, The Business and Legal Challenges of
Social Entrepreneurship, 41 Am. Bus. L. J. 67, 69 (2003).
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importance of small business modeling, and how the Ethnivestor should be able to
seamlessly operate within the NMTC structure.
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Section 1 – Part I.
(A) NMTC Background and Regulatory Structure
To stimulate the investment of private equity capital into low income urban and
rural America, the 106th Congress in the waning years of the Clinton administration
amended the internal revenue code15 to allow a tax credit in the amount of 39% of a
taxpayer’s equity investment over a 7-year period if that taxpayer invested in low income
communities.16 And it is not an unfunded mandate. In hopes of generating $15 billion of
equity investments between 2002 and 2007, the federal treasury has authority to issue tax
credit to investors equal to 39% of that sum ($5.85 billion dollars).17 The credits are
distributed by rounds based on the size of equity commitments by qualified investor
groups. Already investments and corresponding tax credits are allocated through four of
five anticipated rounds.18 The Treasury has delegated the responsibility for distribution
and administration of the program to the Community Development Fund Institution
(“CDFI”). 19
The focus of the NMTC is to benefit low-income communities by drawing equity
capital into these target communities.20 The “draw” is a tax credit. By reducing an
investor’s tax liability, the economic return on the investment in the low income area is
increased akin to the successful Low Income Housing Tax Credit program.21 A
byproduct of the equity investment is restored commerce within those communities.22
15 On May 23, 2000, President Clinton and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert publicly announced an
agreed proposal that led to the introduction of the Community Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000. HR
4923, 106th Cong. (2000). What emerged from the conference deliberations of both chambers was the bill
entitled The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (“CRTRA”) H.R. 5662, 106th Cong. (2000).
Despite its complexity and permutations, the bill was introduced December 14, 2000, and voted on and
passed the same day. Robert W. Oast, Jr., Incentives for Economic Development in Underserved
Communities and for Affordable Housing: A Selective Look at the Legislative Initiatives in the 106th
Congress, 33 Urb. Law. 793, 795 Urban Lawyer (Summer 2001). The CRTRA was signed into law on
December 21, 2000, tucked away into obscurity within the massive appropriations act. Title I of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, PUB. L. NO. 106-569, 114 Stat. 2944 (2000) Thus, it received
little fan-fare or public attention beyond those already in the know. Actual legislative history is equally
obscure.
16 I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2)(A-B) (2004). These sections specifically provide for a credit of 5% of the equity
investment for the first 3 years, followed by a 6% credit for the remaining years.
17 I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(A-D).
18 The 2002 round equity amount was $2.5 billion. The 2003 round amount was $3.5 billion. For 2005, the
amount was $2 billion, and for 2006 the equity allocation was $3.5 billion. The 2007 equity to be raised is
$3.5 billion. See the statutory authority of I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(A-D) and the 2003 Accountability Report of
the US Department of Treasury, CDFI Fund at http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/2004/2003-annual-report.pdf.
19 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602 (2004). Original cite included—Fed Reg. Vol. 690, No. 248 (12-28-2004).
20 Mulock, supra n. 12 at Summary. Available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Economics/econ-
73.cfm?&CFID=179847&CFTOKEN=80276519#_1_1 (accessed Nov. 3, 2005).
21 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit provides an approximate 9 percent tax credit for new construction
or rehabilitation expenditures for low income households over a 10-year period. See I.R.C. § 1437f.
22 Jennifer Forbes, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban Revitalization: A
comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 177, 188 (2006),
citing statements of Rep. Rangel, 145 Cong. Rec. E1761 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999).
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The general NMTC transaction can be described as follows:
1. An investor 23must invest a qualified equity investment (“QEI”) into a qualified
community development entity (“CDE”).24
2. The CDE must then take the investor’s QEI and invest those sums into a low
income community project, either directly, or through a qualified community-
based organization (“QCB”) or other approved entities that serve the low income
area.25
3. The credit is considered for the period commencing with the date the initial
investment and each of the 6 anniversary dates thereafter.26 The credit is 5% for
the initial three years, and 6% for the remaining 4 years, equating to a 39% credit
over the total of 7 years. 27
The anchor for the tax credit ship is the CDE.28 The general scheme is that the
CDE receives the investor taxpayer’s equity investment (“QEI”)29 and redirects it (in the
form of a qualified low income community investment to a low income community
business (the QCB). It is the CDE that funnels the credits to the investors. A CDE must
satisfy three requirements. First, its primary mission must be serving, or providing
investment capital for low-income communities or low-income persons.30 Second, a CDE
must provide for low income resident representation “on any governing board of the
entity or on any advisory board to the entity”.31 Third, the Director of the CDFI must
formally certify the community development entity.32
Since the tax credit is only provided to investors in exchange for a “qualified”
equity investment, the basis of qualification is important to the scheme. The CDE must
use substantially all of the cash for qualified low-income community investments to
qualify as an equity investment33. In construing the requirement that “substantially all”
of the QEI must be for low income community investments, the final regulations provide
23 Also termed the “taxpayer” since that person is the recipient of the tax credits.
24 I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1).
25 Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(i).
26 I.R.C. § 45 (a)(3)(A-B).
27 To illustrate the credit, assume an equity investment of $100,000 in year 1. For year 1, 2, and 3, the
credit is $5,000 (5% of $100,000) for a total of $15,000. The 6% credit on the same 100,000 investment for
the following four years is $6,000 each of the remaining four years for a total of $24,000. The combined
credit is $39,000 ($15,000 plus $24,000).
28 A qualified CDE can be any domestic corporation or partnership. I.R.C. § 45D(6)(c)(1). An individual
conducting business as a sole proprietor is excluded.
29 Reg. § 1.45D-1(b).
30 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A).
31 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B).
32 I.R.C. § 45D(6)(c)(1)(C).
33 I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(B). The QEI must be paid to a qualified community development entity (“CDE”),
I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1), acquired at its original issue (directly or through an underwriter) solely in exchange for
cash, I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(A), and the CDE must designate the investment as such on its books and records.
Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(1)(iii). For a corporation, the type of authorized “equity investment” can include any
stock, except certain preferred stock. Excluded is nonqualified preferred stock as defined in section
351(g)(2) of the I.R.C. The taxpayer investor can be a limited liability company or business trust, which is
taxed as a partnership for federal tax purposes,
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that 85% of the gross assets must be so directed, and that the requirement must be
satisfied for each annual period in the 7 years available for the tax credit.34
Procedurally, the program is administered through the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund (“CDFI”). The application process requires a mini-business
plan prior to certification of acceptance into the program.35 For an overview of the
process and typical parties to a NMTC transaction see attached Table A.
(B) Definitions as Best Evidence of Congressional Intent to Primarily Benefit
Low Income Residents Not High Income Residents in Low Income Areas
The magnitude of the NMTC distribution begets the question: Who are the real
beneficiaries of the tax credit subsidy? It could be that Congress intended to benefit
whoever desired into move to the low income areas, or rather the low income residents
and its existing businesses, or those equity investors who receive the tax credit. The
answer could be all of the above. The plan could be designed for some and not for others.
And the plan in operation could be at variance with the original intent. This sub-part
concerns the original intent by Congress. The next sub-part treats the program in
operation.
Clearly, one intended beneficiary is the investor because she receives the tax
credit. The NMTC mechanism allows investor groups of all types to provide the funds
that serve the community. But the real issue is a matter of degree. Among those various
potential recipients, who is designed as the “primary” beneficiary of that subsidy? What
if an investor’s appetite for a high rate of return generates a project so expensive only the
wealthy can afford it? A 10 story high priced condominium would be beyond the
economic reach of a low income resident. That core resident is perhaps unwittingly
reclassified from a primary beneficiary to a residual beneficiary, where benefits are at
best trickled down from the condo owner. For such projects, those existing low income
residents are left behind and financially unfed. If the primary beneficiary is the investor
or wealthy new residents to the community, then the reduced benefit to the low income
residents is of little consequence
The NMTC definitions provide sufficient, albeit imperfect, clarity as to the
intended beneficiaries of the program through its definitions. Qualified investments, by
definition, are designed to benefit a “low income community”.36 Metropolitan low-
income communities are defined as areas where the poverty rate is at least twenty percent
of the statewide or area median family income, or where the median family income does
not exceed eighty percent of that same state-wide or median income criterion.37 The
statute defines non-metropolitan areas as low-income communities if the median family
income does not exceed eighty percent of the statewide median family income.38 The
34 Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(5).
35 Procedurally, an application is filed and reviewed by the CDFI based specified criteria, including the
extent of past assistance to disadvantaged businesses or communities I.R.C. § 45D(f)(2)(A).
36 Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(i) provide that the qualified equity investment is funneled through the CDE into a
low income community project.
37 New Markets Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. §45D(e)(1)(A) (2000).
38 Id. § 45D(e)(1)(B)(ii).
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statute also incorporates targeted populations, as defined by the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, into the definition of low-
income communities.39
Importantly, the low-income definition captures not only financial poverty, but
also the lack of access to capital—a pervasive problem in perpetuating poverty.40 It is
therefore clear that NMTC program envisions primary assistance to a “target population”,
and that target population is those who have suffered the effects of poverty. It is only that
group within the community who has lacked historic access to capital. If Congress had
intended to target the financially well healed, it would have expanded the definition,
instead of limiting it to those who have a lacked access to capital.
Beyond definitions of the target population, other indicia of intended beneficiaries
are from examining the role of each party to the transaction. The requirement that the
CDE must have low income residents on advisory boards,41 that 85% of the gross assets
of the CDE must be devoted to low income communities,42 and a mechanism is in place
to funnel the equity funds into an active low income community business which derives
its income or services from that community,43 are all prime indications that Congress
intended each party to the transaction is purposely designed as a mere conduit to the
delivery of equity capital to existing low income community residents, not new entrants
without the economic need.
39 Id. See also, 12 U.S.C. 4702(2000) defining targeted populations as low-income or “otherwise lack[ing]
adequate access to loans or equity investments.
40 See generally Daniel M. Leibsohn, Financial Services Innovation in Community Development, 8-WTR
JAHCDL 122 (1999) (describing the need for flexible, accessible capital in low-income communities).
41 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B).
42 Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(5). 
43 I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(i-iii).
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Part II
PROGRAM IN OPERATION: GENTRIFICATION
AND PROBLEMATIC PURPOSED PROJECTS
“Observers [of the NMTC industry] suggest that it is
commercial real estate development driven, which raises
questions about whether it will foster gentrification in the
absence of careful community planning”44
If Congress truly intended the primary beneficiaries of the NMTC program to be
the existing low income residents, the question becomes is the program in operation
fulfilling that intent? If, as depicted in the previous section, an investor can receive the
tax credit subsidy for building a 10-story condominium at purchase prices beyond the
economic reach of low income residents, is the program too broad in operation? The
model that permits the above-described project is, respectfully submitted, up-side-down.
As advocated throughout this article, the type of project should be decided not based on
what is most profitable to the investor, but what most meets the needs of the community.
Thus, I attempt an analytical construct for a tax credit policy that prioritizes those low
income residents, placing them in the front of the line with a chair at the tax planning
table as full fledged participants in the NMTC program. 45
The answer in my view does not start with my above conclusion, but rather with
an analysis of the type of model actually used by those who administer the program, the
CDFI. Whether by design or fiat, the CDFI has at least two conceptual choices. As
described below there is a “place-based” concept that targets people in a particular place,
and a “pure people” concept, targeting people regardless of residency. Congress has
historically offered various forms of subsidy from tax revenues to eliminate urban
blight.46 Enterprise zones and the NMTC program are both generally designed to reduce
poverty in low income areas through economic growth.47 But the methodology to
accomplish that goal differs. The enterprise zones utilize a “place-based” policy, meaning
the zones are designed to revitalize a place, i.e. the urban core communities, “in order to
help local residents”.48 The underlying theory is that “people cannot be separated from
place, and …an antipoverty strategy needs to treat individuals in the context of their
44 Susan R. Jones, Will New Markets tax Credits Enhance Community Economic Development, 8 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. 229, 237 (2004). Indeed, those observers who questioned whether commercial real estate
projects were the apple of investor’s eye have an answer. According to CDFI’s own statistics, “61% of the
NMTC proceeds will be used to finance and support real estate projects…” (available at
http://www.cdfifund.gov/awardees/2005/2005NMTC-FAQs.pdf).
45 This is not to say those who have significant financial resources from whatever residency source should
be excluded from any role in urban revitalization. There are various private industry programs and other
federal subsidies available for development in inner cities. But here elected federal representatives of the
American taxpayers earmark public funds to be used to revitalize low income areas and residents of those
areas, who are more in need of dialysis machines than movie theatres, qualitative grocery stores than
Starbucks, and simply houses rather than opera houses. The model that follows is designed to more
effectively use the NMTC subsidy to meet those needs.
46 Harden, supra n. 2, at 5.
47 Forbes, supra n. 22, at 177.
48 Id. at 193.
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community.” 49 The method of the empowerment zones and related programs50 was to
provide skill training and counseling to local residents so they would “also benefit from
the revitalization of the area through employment opportunities and improved social
structures.51
The NMTC law52, unlike Enterprise Zone legislation, is less clear and has fallen
into a conceptual conundrum. The stated purpose of the NMTC is consistent with the
goal of primarily benefiting the core low income residents.53 Notwithstanding the
apparent congressional purpose, the NMTC program in operation appears to be designed
to enhance economic development – but not necessarily for the local residents. This is a
policy for economic growth of a geographic area, even if the growth benefits primarily
those who came in from outside that area. 54 As one commentator observed, the NMTC
program “does not focus on the economic well-being of local residents as one of its
primary goals…no incentives exist to target jobs or services towards local, low income
residents…Instead the program looks to improve the economic well-being of individuals
extending far beyond the defined area.”55 And most poignantly, NMTC scholars
conclude that the NMTC has been focused on “targeting a geographic space and not
necessarily the needs of the people within that space”. 56 Thus, the NMTC does not
foretell economic mobility to low-income residents through job placement and fails to
address other issues such as schools, job training, and housing that are key components in
the attainment of long-term economic success.”57 This falls within the “pure people-
oriented” strategy which advocates assistance to people regardless of where they live,
thereby increasing human capital and mobility since the benefits would follow them
regardless of where they relocate. 58
49 Id. at 193.
50 After fist and starts early in the Reagan administration, Congress passed legislation in 1987 and
established 100 enterprise zones that remained largely ineffective due to a lack of tax incentives until
spurred into action after the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 under the Clinton administration. Only then was
emphasis placed on tax credits and coordinated federal resources through Social Services Block Grants. In
1993, Clinton signed legislation that established nine enterprise zones and ninety-five enterprise
communities. Through a competitive bidding process additional rounds of zones were created in 1998 and
2001. See Forbes, supra n. 22, at 183.
51 Id. 194.
52 The law is codified in primarily two areas, statutorily in I.R.C. § 45D, and the accompanying
Regulations, Reg. § 45D.
53 The statute states its purpose is to provide a “qualified equity investment” I.R.C. § 45D(b) for “target
populations,” I.R.C. § 45D(e)(2), within the “low income community”. (I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1). The
regulations generally state the purpose of the federal subsidy (tax credit) is to be an incentive for investors
to provide equity capital into projects designed to serve the “low income community” and “low income
residents”. Reg. § 1.45D-1(d). As this article reveals, the bedeviling issues of purpose and fulfillment
thereof are in the details.
54 Forbes, supra n. 22, at 177.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id at 194-195.
58 Id at 195 citing Helen F. Ladd, Spacially Targeted Economic Development Strategies: Do they Work? 1
CITYSCAPE 193, 196 (1994).
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The two opposing models are illustrated below:
Non-Core Beneficiary
Core Area
Core Beneficiary
In Core Area
People in
Place
Oriented
People-Oriented
(Regardless of Place)
The most fundamental difference between the two models, in my view, is in the
intended beneficiaries. The People-Oriented model that targets the space but not the core
residents of that space allows the intended beneficiaries to be anyone, regardless of the
relationship to the low income community. If the NMTC program is flexible enough to
allow projects that only high income people can afford, the intended beneficiaries
become only those who can afford the projects developed, e.g. the earlier 10 story
condominium illustration. As such, a model is in essence a subsidization of gentrification
by another name, where the financially well healed can claim as its ‘new market” a core
urban area. I maintain that the People-Oriented model, therefore, is ill-conceived as a
means to primarily benefit low income residents, as Congress intended.
The evidence of whether this model is operational in the NMTC program is
shown by following the money. If the project’s goal is to primarily benefit financially
well healed new entrants to the community, and the NMTC program endorses that focus,
upscaling projects can be authorized. If on the other hand, the intended beneficiaries are
the existing low income residents, then the only authorized projects are likely to be such
projects as health care facilities for the ills most acute to the existing low income
residents, affordable housing for the elderly and chronically financially distressed,
innovative non-conforming loans and financial services for those who lack access to
capital, and charter schools for local children. If the NMTC program allows both, it
misses the mark – if the mark is indeed to assist the core low income residents. Scholarly
discussion of the historic and recurring failure of urban redevelopment points to this same
root cause, where the conceptual model of redevelopment planners does not start with
low income residents as “clients” of the redevelopment. Instead, the focus is on luring
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white citizenry back to the cities.59 It does not take sophisticated empirical analysis to
predict that a revitalization plan for an area that does not make those residents the
“client” does not appear well designed to solve the problem.
To determine whether the CDFI authorizes the People-Oriented gentrification
model, I examined descriptions of award winning projects. I also examined websites of
CDEs that were given allocations. Many entities that have received allocations have not
declared a precise project.60 But of the identified projects in each round of NMTC
awards, approximately $2 billion of tax credit subsidy has been allocated to projects that
appear to be designed primarily for those already with the very access to capital that the
low income residents lack.61 It is worth reiterating that the “target population” for the
tax subsidy program includes those who historically lacked access to capital.62 Many
projects, particularly those with mixed use project types, include movie theatres,
performing art centers for opera, symphony and ballet, hotels like the Marriott Inn with
connected convention centers,63 museums, upscale commercial office, retail outlets, and
even tourist centers. I have designated these project types as “Problematic Purposed
Projects” because they appear to be inconsistent with the Congressional intent to
primarily benefit the low income target population as defined in the law.
There have been four rounds of allocation awards of NMTC funds.64 A sampling
of those problematic projects is described in amount and type segregated by round in the
attached Table B. Listed below is a summary of the amount of tax credit subsidies
provided to such projects to provide a sense of the cost to taxpayers for authorizing those
types of projects.65
Allocation Year Problematic Project
Equity Investment
Problematic Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
2002 $1.6 billion $624 million
2003 $1.1 billion $429 million
2005 $744 million $290.1 million
2006 $1.9 billion $741 million
TOTAL $5.3 billion $2 billion (Rounded)
These amounts are subject to adjustments due to the lack of clarity among CDEs
as to exactly how the funds would be used. Many project descriptions include a mix of
59 Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing The Central City with Resident Control,
27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 689, 743 (1994).
60 This conclusion is derived from the author’s review of CDFI documents through four rounds of
allocations.
61 The statistics are from the CDFI’s own profiles of the allocation award winners at http://www.cdfi.gov
and the websites of the Allocatees with press releases concerning the projects.
62 I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1).
63 For example, a NMTC subsidy of $15, 263,157 was allocated in Round III (2005) for a project
investment of $106 million. The awardee was Louisville Development Bancorp, Inc. The purpose is the
construction of a 617-room convention center and hotel, (The Marriott Louisville Downtown Convention
Hotel). See http://www.morethanabank,com/New%20Markets%20Tax%20Credit/winners.htm and the
CDFI allocate profiles at http://www.cdfi.gov.
64 The Rounds were (1) in 2002-2003, (2) in 2003, (3) in 2004, and (4) in 2006.
65 These findings are from the author’s review of the CDFI’s profiles of allocatees. See supra n. 60.
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problematic and proper purposes, though the vast majority of project types and costs are
associated with the problematic projects.66
Are subsidized gentrification projects necessarily antithetical to assisting low
income residents? Are “Problematic Purposed Projects” a natural and predictable
byproduct of gentrification? Or conversely, are gentrified projects a primary benefit to
low income residents? The answer appears to depend on how gentrification is defined
and characterized. Two definitions of gentrification have come to the fore among
scholarly literature. One that considers displacement of low income residents as included
in the definition, and one that excludes displacement. Interestingly, those two definitions
have their conceptual roots in the same two models discussed above for urban renewal
through economic revitalization - the “People-Oriented regardless of Place model, and
“People in Place” model. Scholarly debate on whether gentrification is an adverse or a
positive influence on the core residents breaks down philosophically on the basis of
which urban revitalization model is employed.
Like the People in Place model where the benefits inure to the core beneficiary in
the core area, those who define gentrification as a displacement of low income residents
employ the theory of unity between the place and the existing residents, so the benefits to
the place must also include benefiting primarily the people already “in place”.67 Under
this view, the influx of new wealthy residents is viewed as adversely affecting those
existing low income residents.68
A contrary definition of gentrification excludes “displacement” as part of the
definition, and instead refers to gentrification as a “process by which people of higher
incomes move into lower income urban areas and seek to change its physical and social
fabric to better meet their needs and preferences.”69 The needs and preferences targeted
are those of any persons, not just those who are existing residents in place. This is
conceptually aligned with the People-Oriented model. That model targets anyone who
can afford the market prices and it is their “needs and preferences” that are prioritized,
not the poorer existing residents. The beneficiary under this definition can include
anyone, including of course those new entrants to the community without having to tie
the existing low income residents already in place. Under this theory, gentrification has a
positive impact. This later theory does not ignore displacement but does not blame
gentrification. The displacement culprit is the government, for its persistent failure to
produce sufficient housing for the poor.70
The flaw of this non-displacement view is the same as the Pure People model and
other historic urban revitalization missteps discussed above. Just as urban revitalization
66 The amount is subject to a potentially large upward adjustment since a significant number of the CDFI
profiles did not specify any project types. The larger projects include the hotels, convention centers, opera
houses, etc. beyond the types of projects I consider to be properly purposed. A downward adjustment is
also likely since it cannot be determined from the published materials the percentage mix between the
gentrified projects and those truly designed for low income residents. Many projects have a combination of
both. It appears the greatest dollar volume will be to build the largest projects, which again appear to be
problematic.
67 John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Tem the Old ‘One-Two: Gentrification and the K.O. of
Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOWARD L.J. 433-435 (2003).
68 Id.
69 J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOWARD L. R. 405 (2003).
70 Id.
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has lacked success for failing to prioritize the needs of the “client” urban residents over
the wants of the wealthy who seek to rediscover this marketplace, gentrification
definitions that exclude displacement similarly fail to prioritize the client – the low
income resident. It is the client low income resident that suffers the displacement. And to
reassign blame to the government for the cause of the displacement could at best only add
to the burden of government rather than the private sector. To date, that formula has not
proven successful. As stated earlier, the redevelopment plan for the community that
conceptually does not prioritize the existing community residents is not well designed to
revitalize the area.
One proponent of the non-displacement definition concludes that even if the
target is low income residents in place, gentrification is a net gain for the low income
residents.71 Under his analysis, urban residents currently have better employment
opportunities in the suburbs, so increased investment in new shops and services within
the urban community provides more jobs within the urban core. In his view, the increased
level of high end jobs also increases the supply of support jobs for which low income
residents can qualify.72 He also claims gentrification should improve retail and grocery
shopping for low income people,73 though he fails to detail how that would occur if the
majority of low income residents cannot afford the products brought into the target
community for the gentrifiers who have more leisure income to afford those products.
That theory also fails for two principal reasons. First gentrification depends on
trickle down economics. Since Problematic Purposed Projects appear designed to benefit
the financially well healed new entrants to the area, low income residents are merely
incidental beneficiaries of the NMTC program. The benefits for low income benefits
must therefore be residual in nature, a morphed trickle down of benefits from the wealthy
newcomers to the area.
Trickle down economics has not been a user friendly model for those at the lower
rung of the ladder. By definition, the trickle down theory “assumes that by helping
directly already-wealthy person X we will in fact help disadvantaged person Y in a more
sustainable manner than by helping person Y directly.”74 Historical views by scholars of
urban revitalization have well documented the failures of this theory in application.75 The
conclusion is described as follows: “The net result is that a neighborhood of poor people
is replaced by office towers, luxury hotels, or retail centers. The former low-income
residents displaced by the bulldozer or an equally effective increase in rents, must
relocate into another area they can – perhaps – afford.”76 This conclusion is arguably
more normative than empirical. But the same can be said to a greater degree, with less
empirical support, about the notion that greater investment will lead to significant job
growth. As one study concluded the causal connection between capital investment and
job growth among the low income residents is “untested and usually unproven”. 77 And
without sophisticated statistical analysis, can’t we take the equivalent of judicial notice to
71 Id at 406.
72 Id at 419.
73 Id at 420.
74 Quinones, supra n. 59, at 724-751.
75 Id at 741 and cited references therein.
76 Id.
77 Id at 746, citing Robert Mier, Job Generation As a Road to Recovery in Social Justice and Local
Development Policy 34 (ROBERT MIER ED. 1993).
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observe that if the federal subsidy is used for a $500,000 condominium in New Orleans,
the displaced low income resident of the 9th Ward who could have used an affordable
home project instead, has little or nothing as a trickle down benefit? Isn’t he certainly,
something far less than an operational primary beneficiary? What is the quantified
amount of tax benefits trickling down from a tax subsidy for a $100 million Hilton Inn
and Convention Center when that same 9th Ward used-to-be resident receives perhaps a
$10,000 - $20,000 job? No amount of fringe benefits or other multiplied extensions of
benefits would elevate him to primary beneficiary status. Conversely, there is ample
empirical evidence that redevelopment project areas normally become “gentrifying
markets” without material increase in the quality of life of the low income residents.78
That notion is aligned with the author’s definition of gentrification that is raised below.
A second reason gentrification does not have a positive impact on low income
residents are because of marginalization or squeezing out of existing low income
residents. To illustrate the process of marginalization, assume a low income resident is a
renter, unable to afford to own a home. Assume the owner of the apartment building
faces higher taxes and insurance costs due to increased property values from new
construction or renovations to accommodate gentrifiers. The landlord also believes there
is an increasing market of higher income potential renters. He is likely to increase the
rent to meet the higher debt service and maintain or improve profitability. The low
income renter has to pay the higher rent charged by a landlord. Assume too the low
income existing resident has static income. Though she may not have to move out – yet –
she nonetheless has been increasingly marginalized because she has less money for other
living expenses due to the effect of gentrification. That rising rent scenario has been
termed “secondary displacement” or “indirect displacement” 79 As one study concludes,
paying higher rent without a corresponding increase in personal welfare is a negative
effect of gentrification. This assumes that the gentrifier wants are different than the core
residents needs. While certainly there are some harmonious projects, there appear to be
an alarming number of circumstances where subsidized projects designed for gentrifiers
appear incompatible with the core resident needs and therefore at variance with the goals
of the NMTC legislation.
In sum, the likely failure of trickle down economics and the more likely
marginalization of low income residents stand as detriments and unintended
consequences of gentrification that dwarf the above-claimed benefits to the low income
residents of the non-displacement definition of gentrification. Since I believe a definition
should incorporate the elements that give the term its character, or give attribution to
what it affects, I define gentrification more broadly than either of the previously
described definitions.
This article views gentrification as having two definitional components. First
there is an influx of new residents with resources significantly beyond the existing
residents. Second, and most importantly, the potential infusion of new residents must
motivate landlords and commercial owners to upscale properties to accommodate the
accoutrements of opulence of the new residents. This definition establishes a causal
connection to a sustained displacement or marginalization of existing urban low income
residents. Under this definition, it is the conversion of resources, not merely the infusion
78 Id at 748.
79 Byrne, supra n. 69, at 414.
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of people that is the cornerstone of gentrification.80 New residents could conceivably go
to the same video stores, churches, and grocery stores as the existing residents without
causing a displacement or marginalization of those existing residents. Existing business
owners could conceivably maintain affordable rents, menu prices, and the government
could establish rent subsidies to minimize rising housing costs for the poor and elderly. It
is only when landlords, owners of vacant and dilapidated housing, restaurant owners, and
the like start what I will call “upscaling”, so that the life style of the new residents
becomes entrenched to the economic and quality of life detriment of the existing
residents that gentrification becomes operational.
The definition is also race neutral. No preference is provided based on race or
ethnicity.81 Under this definition therefore, new residents with wealth, regardless of race
or ethnicity, could bring resources to the community and feed into the existing cultural
lifestyle, maintain affordable housing, contribute to the charitable causes that improve the
living quality of life of the existing residential base, and gentrification still has not
occurred. But if the new infusion of residents also brings with them facilities to
accommodate a standard not affordable or desired or of primary benefit of the existing
community, gentrification is in process.
Under this article’s gentrification definition, the failure to account for
displacement allows the thwarting of congressional intent in passing the NMTC
legislation and would ignore two fundamental principles that I assert are important in
developing the revitalization model for tax credits: (1) prioritizing needs of the most
needy over the wants of the wealthy and (2) identification of the intended versus
incidental beneficiaries. If federal funds are intended to primarily meet the needs of poor
urban residents, then the more such funds are used to instead accommodate the wants
(accoutrements of opulence) of new entrants, there is a diversion of funds that pushes
revitalization opportunities further away from those intended low income residents –
hence a marginalization rather than mainstreaming of tax benefits.82
Of course there is a continuum of project uses that may benefit the target
populations and low income communities at some level. Low income residents could
potentially enjoy an opera or a visit an art gallery if they could afford the prices of the
pieces, or taking in a movie during leisure time. And certainly some target low income
residents could benefit from commercial office space, if they could afford to rent an
80 One definition of gentrification is “the displacement of low-income individuals by young affluent
homeowners as they ‘discover’ downtown residential areas, renovate homes, and thereby raise rents.”
Quinones, supra n. 59, at 748. The essence of gentrification, in my view, is the conversion of the area,
which has more of a genesis with those who owned and made the property available, than those who decide
to move in. The starting point is not therefore with the affluent, young or not, who buy the property. Rather
it is those who increase the rents, or built the luxury condominiums who are more the proximate cause of
the conversion.
81 Constitutional issues could be raised, but is beyond the scope of this article. A brief discussion of race
neutrality in the article’s CDFI-required needs assessment is discussed infra, note 103.
82 Id at 414-415, citing Jacob L. Vignor, Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?, BROOKINGS-WHARTON
PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 133, 167-168 (2002). It is important to note that gentrification is a group dynamic,
descriptive of a group experience. So a single homeowner that benefits from appreciation on sale of the
residence does not mean that gentrification is not occurring. It is rather a matter of degree. The extent of
damages to the poor due to gentrification is beyond the scope of this article, as empirical proofs would be
required. The issue treated in detail in other published materials. See Powell, supra n. 67.
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office and had a job to make it reasonable to occupy it.83 And a condominium would be
wonderful if the low income target population could afford the mortgage. And some jobs
could flow from the new commerce created in the area. But such uses are not well
designed as primarily for a community and population with third world health care,
chronic unemployment and over 50% drop out rates among its male youth,
unprecedented incarceration of up to 6 of every 10, substandard and overpriced grocery
stores, and a lack of access to the capital to change the circumstance. The salient issue is
whether the people’s tax dollars are used to meet the needs of the low income residents as
earmarked by Congress. These Problematic Purposed Projects do not appear to meet that
purpose.
Another unintended consequence of gentrified NMTC projects is no different
fundamentally than what has been observed by urban demographers as the byproduct of
other urban redevelopment programs – opportunity costs.84 Those costs are substantial
and have been enumerated in prior studies.85 There are physical construction costs. This
refers to actual construction that was ineffective at meeting resident needs, and thereby
precluding construction that would have been better suited.86 In theory it is akin to the
property appraisal concepts of the failure to build based on the “highest and best use” for
the site. Also prominent is the lost time and effort of governmental actors for misguided
development projects. The staff time, including the huge resources associated with
negotiating with private developers, creating and evaluating feasibility reports, holding
public hearings and then analyzing and publishing materials therefrom are all costs for
gentrified projects that miss the mark.87 There are also costs from the nationalization of
project types, where the cookie cutter format of office buildings, high-tech developments,
hotel-convention centers complexes, inter alia, have replicated themselves as a matter of
policy. That policy also replicated and compounds the error since in many cases, the
construction would have occurred in any event and the subsidies were not needed.88 The
more obvious and devastating personal costs are to the low income residents themselves
who suffer the inordinate risk of displacement or marginalization.89
Will the gentrification and Problematic Purposed Projects develop in areas
devastated by Hurricane Katrina? In the most recent of the four rounds of allocations,
$600 million is specifically allocated for use in such areas, defined as the Hurricane
Katrina Gulf Opportunity Zone (“GO Zone”).90 From the inception of the program, there
have been over 230 entities created under the internal revenue code to receive the subsidy
83 The office rents and condominium prices for a vast majority of the projects is
unavailable as many projects have not released data or have yet to finalize plans in that
regard. But from the data gathered to date, a multitude of projects are at least
“problematic” and appear common sensical beyond the intended purpose of the NMTC
program.
84 See Quinones, supra n. 59, at 742-744.
85 Id. at 724-751.
86 Id. at 724.
87 Id. at 742-743.
88 Id. at 744.
89 Id. at 750-751.
90 See the CDFI website at www.cdfi.gov. The $600 million of NMTC funds was authorized by the Gulf
Opportunities Act of 2005 for recovery and redevelopment of what was termed the Hurricane Katrina Gulf
Opportunity Zone (“GO Zone”).
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to help the urban core. Less than a handful of those entities are African American
owned.91 For cities like New Orleans where nearly 70% of the city and the vast majority
of the displaced residents are African American, the entities receiving federal subsidies
for reconstruction therefore do not include them.92 And though the majority of those
entities with GO Zone awards have not identified specific projects,93 many have included
the same type of general descriptions that brought gentrified projects to other urban core
residents in the prior 3 rounds.94
For example, the Chevron NMTC Fund LLC received an allocation of $50
million for the GO Zone.95 The Chevron plan is to use the federal subsidies to help
construct “hotels, office space, retail, light industrial and mixed-use buildings” 96 Who
are they building the projects for? It is far from pure speculation to surmise that the hotels
are not primarily for the displaced low income residents. I suspect they will not be asked
in Homeland Security fashion to be permanent hotel guests. I suspect they may receive
janitorial jobs that trickle down from the multi-million dollar developments. But is the
bulk of the $50 million likely to be used for affordable housing complex, replete with
nearby grocery stores and health care facilities designed to meet the needs of the low
income residents the subsidy was designed to assist?
Not all CDEs with Katrina GO allocations are problematic in purpose. A very few
have described what I term Properly Purposed Projects like Capital Link, Inc.97 They
received a $15 million allocation which they assert will be used to provide “Federally
Qualified Health Centers” to the actual low income residents and the uninsured. That is a
dramatically different purpose and intended beneficiary than a hotel project, which by
very definition is designed for the wealthy owners of the facility. The low income
residents who likely cannot afford the occupancy rates have at best residual benefits.
The focus of this article, however, is not confined to exposing misguided projects.
The next Part also presents an analytical construct to proliferate projects truly designed
for the low income communities and their corresponding target populations. Such
projects already exist within the NMTC program. They primarily involve community
healthcare facilities, financing for non-profit community based organizations, child care,
social service centers, community development real estate projects, senior centers,
providing below market nonconventional unsecured commercial loans, and affordable
housing for truly low income residents. These project types are termed “Properly
91 Two Hundred thirty three CDEs have received allocations as of June 29, 2006 according to CDFI
announcements on its website at www.cdfi.gov. The CDFI published Profiles describes 3 entities as being
majority or 100% minority owned, although one of which is an LLC, and the general partner is actually the
award winner that may not be a minority concern.
92 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. A study based on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency data concluded that Katrina’s effects were “disproportionately
borne by the region’s African American community, by people who rented their homes, and by the poor
and unemployed.” Robert P. Stoker & Michael J. Rich, Lessons and Limits: Tax Incentives and Rebuilding
the Gulf Coast after Katrina 1 (Brookings Institut. 2006).
93 The conclusion is based on the author’s review of CDFI profiles from the 2006 round that includes all
GO Zone allocations.
94 Id.
95 See the CDFI website at www.cdfi.gov.
96 Id. JPMorgan Chase & Co. also received $50 million to develop commercial real estate ventures,
presumably with a mix of other, but quite possibly lesser community-based facilities.
97 See Fourth Round-2006 New Markets Tax Credit Allocatees at www.cdfi.gov.
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Purposed Projects” because author believes are most precisely within the intent of
Congress when the NMTC legislation was passed.
The NMTC legislation was also thoughtful enough to build into the program a
monitoring and evaluation process.98 There are various actions that the CDFI can take to
ensure that the allocations are properly made to appropriate entities. Part III of this
article attempts to assist in that effort as the CDFI assesses the impact of the new markets
credits on low-income communities.
98 Not later than January 31 of 2004, 2007, and 2010, the Comptroller General of the United States must
report to Congress, pursuant to an audit, on the NMTC program, including all qualified community
development entities that receive an allocation under the credit.
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Part III
The Gentrification Alternative -
The Properly Purposed Project
Developed through Harmonious
CDE and QCB Entities
As noted above, some commentators argue that gentrification is a net gain for low
income residents. If that theory is true in all cases, then the use of NMTCs for such
developments as opera houses, high priced condominiums, and convention centers would
also benefit the urban poor. The reality, however, is more complicated. The extent of
benefits to a low income community, some tangible, some intangible, are a matter of
degree and difficult to quantify. And if it is just a matter of degree, then all projects have
at least some level of indirect or residual benefit. Assuming that to be the case, the
precise question is whether the NMTC federal funding scheme mandates that the tax
subsidy is only for those projects that make low income urban residents the primary
beneficiaries. And if Congress intended low income residents to be primary beneficiaries,
and Problematic Purposed Projects as vehicles for gentrification create a mismatch, what
regulatory amendments are necessary to match the program’s operational reality with
congressional intent? The answer to those questions starts with a conceptual model, a
way of thoughtful problem solving, which is discussed in this section. Specific proposed
amendments follow in Part IV.
Transactional End Sum Model
The NMTC purposes may well be served by first starting with identifying an
achievable outcome, and then building the means to meet that end. A similar model
already exists and has had significant measurable success in the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation.99 In the NMTC context, the desired outcome is two-fold: identify a need in
the community and a specific project designed to meet that need. The starting point in my
model is a list of priorities for the types of projects that the target community needs most.
There is a plethora of statistical data on the extent of disparity between the urban core
cities and the general population, subdivided by health, employment, and virtually every
other category that the United States Census tracks.100 Moreover, Congress is fully
capable of establishing a commission to perform a needs assessment so that it can state at
the end of the day: “These are the needs, and these are the types of projects we believe
are designed to meet those needs”.101 I term the needs list a “Mall of Needs” akin to a
strip mall with various business types within it. The projects designed to meet those
needs I term “Properly Purposed Projects”. The Mall of Needs is based on the premise
that the low income core urban residents would rather have quality grocery stores at
99 A more detailed discussion of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is set forth in Section 2 regarding
social entrepreneurship.
100 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001,
THE NATIONAL DATABOOK, Tables 660, 661, 662, 663 (2001) to name a few.
101 The substantive materials could be first established by Congress, subject to the target community’s
localization (top-to bottom) or first established by the communities (bottom-to-top).
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affordable prices to feed their households than a Starbucks. They, I will assume, prefer
qualitative health care clinics specializing in the types of illness that disproportionately
affect core community residents (e.g. sickle cell, kidney failure) to an upscale
commercial office building.102 It would be nice to have it all, but the priority assumed in
this article is for the needs, subrogating the wants.103
Currently, the NMTC program has thoughtfully created criteria by which to
evaluate fund applicants104 but it has not publicly released such a needs assessment. Nor
has it published prioritized project types. That void allows latitude for gentrification
projects that would not otherwise have been authorized if there was a template of needs
and project types, and adherence to that standard in the certification process. If this
paradigm shift occurs, it will be clear to NMTC applicants that the privilege attached to
the credits only inures to those who meet criteria consistent with a Mall of Needs for low
income residents rather than a Mall of Wants for gentrifiers.
102 See Nancy Krieger, Painting a Truer Picture of US Socioeconomic and Racial/Ethnic Health
Inequalities: The Public Health Disparities Geocoding Project, American Journal of Public Health, Vol.
95, No. 2, p. 312, 317 (2005), for findings that poor health among low income communities is attributable
to, inter alia, inadequate “public goods (e.g. supermarkets, health clinics) and environmental pollution.”
Segregation has also increased health disparities. According to the Krieger study, “Also pharmacies in
segregated neighborhoods are less likely to have adequate medication supplies, and hospitals in these
neighborhoods are more likely to close.” Id. at 330.
103 Interjecting into the CDFI criteria cultural connectivity or sensitivity to the particular needs of a
community based on ethnic traits could raise constitutional questions. Racial classifications imposed by the
government are subject to strict scrutiny, and are only constitutional if narrowly drawn. Grutter v Bollinger,
et al, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). None of the amendments offered in this article (e.g. raising the minimum
poverty rate) attempt to add a “racial” classification or preference. An Ethnivestor can be of any race that
has cultural connectivity with the low income community. The low income community may have a mix of
ethnic groups, including immigrant enclaves. Cultural sensitivity is not synonymous with a particular race.
Under all proposed amendments, any investor, CDE or QCB can, for example, determine whether certain
needs are unmet within the community. Ethnivestors may be more attuned to the issues and provide a more
culturally sensitive application to the CDFI. An Ethnivestor may therefore be more likely to propose a
Properly Purposed Project. But no governmentally imposed classification or preference is given because of
race. If a needs assessment must be performed, but without proscribing a governmental preference or
establishing a racial classification, it should be considered “race neutral” in this author’s view. The
preferences should arise as a matter of course in the private marketplace of empirical research. In other
words, if a regulation states: “The CDE shall perform a good-faith needs assessment based on statistical
data publicly available,” and if there is no sickle cell treatment center for a community that has a high
incidence of that disease, that need should be identified and included in the needs assessment. That does not
necessarily mean that particular need must be the CDE’s designated project. But since the CDFI has a
statutory duty to implement a program to assist low income residents in their community, the CDFI should
be within its authority to at least require all applicants, regardless of race, to determine what is needed. If
the project fails to meet any identified need in the community, then the applicant should be provided the
opportunity to receive the subsidy. Even if proposed amendments are considered race conscious
classifications, the language could be carefully crafted to be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
governmental purpose. Nonetheless, determining what is or is not a race-conscious governmental provision
is debatable and beyond the scope of this article.
104 The CDE applicant is evaluated on the following four categories: Business Strategy, Capitalization
Strategy, Management Capacity, and Community Impact. Each category has a maximum of 25 points.
There are additional “priority points” under the business strategy category if the applicant (1) already has a
record of providing capital or technical assistance to disadvantaged businesses or communities or (2)
intends to funnel substantially all of its cash investment to an unrelated low income businesses. Each
applicant is then given a numeric score and ranked. See Notice of Allocation Availability, 69 FED. REG.
49951-49952 (August 12, 2004).
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It is not enough to merely identify needs and conforming project types. It is also
important to conceptually align the parties to the transaction. A business transactional
approach is herein suggested because most fundamentally the program is about
structuring transactions among various parties. Investors deliver a particular product (i.e.
equity capital) to a particular location (i.e. low income areas) for particular beneficiaries
(low income residents). As with any business transaction, each party has separate
interests, and the success of the transaction depends on establishing a win-win
environment for all those who participate in the transaction. That requires a
comprehensive connecting of dots involving all the component parts and players in the
program. A model that simply fulfills the investor’s financial expectations but leaves the
small business in ruins does not adequately incorporate and harmonize the interests of
each part of the transaction. Nor does it most effectively meet the goal of the subsidy.
To harmonize the interests of each party to the transaction, this modeling involves
two hybrid components: a “means-ends factor” and a “balancing of interests” factor. The
means end factor is a process whereby the applicant is first provided the Mall of Needs
and the list of Properly Purposed Project types.105 Those combined items constitute the
End Sum Interests. Only with that End Sum in focus is the transaction devised. The
parties to the transaction, (the investor, CDE, and the QCB) comprise a “Means Team”
because they collectively are the means by which the “end” is achieved. That end is the
Properly Purposed Project for the target community. The concept is that if the Means
Team is required to first focus on the End Sum Interests, there will be a natural weeding
out of those parties that would otherwise attempt to establish gentrifier projects.
The second component of the transactional model is the balancing of interests.
That component has two aspects – a balance internally among the Means Team, and
externally between the Means Team and the target community. Internally, each team
member should balance its own profit motive with the philanthropic motive of assisting
the target community. If the CDE desires a rate of return at odds with the expectations or
distribution of benefits to the small business (QCB), the discord could lead to severing
the relationship. A failed venture also diminishes the value of the tax credit since the
revitalization did not occur. To avoid a loss of benefits from the tax subsidy dollars, the
CDFI should scrutinize the relationships for signs of incongruence.106 Of course, projects
can have a relative level of success without complete failure, and it is not necessarily an
either/or proposition. But it is not a proper balance if the kind of projects that are
authorized are conceptually upscaling without also reaching down to bring the
community with it.
External balance refers to the need to carefully weigh interests of the collective
Means Team against the interests of the target community. A conceptual model that
allows too heavy a weighting of benefits to the Means Team, e.g. an investor that expects
an unrealistic return on an investment rather than the community interests is more likely
to produce a project deliverable that is a Problematic Purposed Project. A Means Team
that intends to drain the resources of the small business that initially received the equity
105 Assuming the list is preliminary and subject to fine tuning, it nonetheless provides a starting point for
aligning and harmonizing the potential parties to the transaction.
106 The CDFI can review operating agreements of LLCs, which is the popular entity of choice for many
operations, scan for oppressive terms, or unrealistic projections of earned income, unusual debt loads by the
smaller entities, or any other contractual terms that appear problematic.
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funds and then immediately sell the property at the conclusion of the tax credit period is
not properly balanced transaction between the respective interests of the community and
the Means Team. Conversely if the model is too heavily weighted in favor of the
community without sufficient financial attraction to the investor and other members of
the Means Team, the equity supply could wither and die, without a nourishing vine to the
community. A philosophical or investment disconnect between the Means Team and the
target community is a prescription for potential failure. The balancing of interests is
therefore vital to the “win-win” circumstance required to meet the congressional purpose.
This transactional entity purpose model is therefore a hybrid approach between Means-
Ends and Balance of Interests.
The model is graphically illustrated below.
Investor-CDE-QCB
(Means Team)
Target Community’s PPP
(End Sum Interests)
Balance of Interests
Internal
Among Means
Team Members
External Between Means Team
And ESI
The CDFI has a certification system that is rigorous in many respects. But if the
balancing of interests and Properly Purposed Projects are to be systematically part of the
NMTC program, amendments to existing publications and regulations should be
considered. The published advice from the CDFI on how to become a CDE does not
mandate how the CDE, QCB and the target community relationships should be
structured.107 There are numerous possibilities, as it should be. However, with flexibility
comes the opportunity for abuse or circumvention of intended purposes, particularly if
the purposes themselves are ambiguously stated. The IRS regulations exist to provide
clarity and close unintended loopholes in determining tax liability and tax credits. They
often include examples to elucidate its interpretation of the statutes. The NMTC statue it
part of the internal revenue code, with regulations. Consistent with this article’s purpose
of adding clarity and closing loopholes, the published materials and regulations should
also provide models examples to guide investor taxpayers in clarifying the conditions
107 The CDFI guidance on the CDE certification is found on its website at http://www.cdfifund.gov.
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under which the tax credit is availing. This model could be part of a suggested set of
ways in which the three parties to the “transaction” can conceptualize how they are to
relate to each other to develop a project. The Regulations could also state that each
applicant is expected to state how it intends to match the Mall of Needs with a Properly
Purposed Project and how each party to the transaction will contribute to that end. As
with other recommendations within this article, this model is designed to narrow the
qualified entities and investment vehicles to more precisely accomplish the statutory goal.
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Part IV
Proposed Amendments to Close Loopholes
As noted in Part II, there are competing models for who are the intended
beneficiaries of the NMTC program. One focuses on people in place within the target
community, while the other benefits people regardless of the place of origin. This article
maintains that the people to be primarily benefited fall within the former model so that
the ‘target population” is comprised of low income residents in place within the low
income community. The support for that conclusion includes careful analysis of the
transactions and related definitions. Below are those transactional definitions, the how the
structural process can be amended to close loopholes that have diverted funds away from
the low income residents of target communities.
(1) The Equity Investment and its Correlation with
Qualified Active Low Income Community Business (“QCB”)
The importance of qualifying an equity investment is previously discussed. But it
is not enough to merely have a qualifying equity investment. The CDE must then invest
that QEI into a community project. Though there are at least four different ways an
investment can be structured (i.e. through loans, or loans in combination with cash, and to
different types of entities), that investment must still be designed for low income
residents within a low income community. One prime scenario is when an investment is
made in an entity that provides financial services. The regulations provide that the
services must specifically be to businesses located in and residents of low-income
communities.108 If the intent of the program was for the financially well healed there
would have been no need for federally sponsored incentives to help them get back on
their collective feet. The point is buttressed in the CDFI official announcements used to
announce upcoming allocations. The criteria for awarding allocations includes the
language: “an applicant will generally score well to the extent that it will deploy debt or
investment capital in products or services which: (1) are designed to meet the needs of
underserved markets… (3) focus on customers or partners that typically lack access to
conventional sources of capital”109 The gentrifiers do not typically lack that access to
capital, but have likely thrived because of it.
A second confirmation that low income residents are the primary beneficiaries is
gleaned from the statutory framework for involving businesses within the low income
community. An investment can be made to a “qualified active low-income community
business” (“QCB”). 110 A QCB is defined as an entity that derives over 50% of its
income from within the low income communities. It must also devote a substantial
portion111 of its property, or services from within the low income community.112 The
108 Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(iii).
109 69 Fed. Reg. 49951 (Aug. 12, 2004).
110 Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1)(A).
111 The “substantial portion” test for tangible property or services is satisfied if 40% of the property (owned
or leased) or services is within the low income community. Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1)(B).
112 The specific QCB requirements tied to low income residents are that (1) at least 50% of the QCB’s total
gross income for the year must be derived from the active conduct of a qualified business within any low-
income community I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(i); (2) A substantial portion of the use of its tangible property,
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investment is only qualified if services are performed and income is from within the
target community. So it follows that Congress intended the investment to flow to a small
business that is an integral part of that community. Since the target population is by
definition low income, the investment must primarily serve those low income residents.
It is the nexus with the low income residents that provides the qualifying status, and
should thus be the focus of the investment. That construction would weigh against an
investment in a hotel-convention center complex, for example. It is difficult to conclude
it is designed primarily for the low income residents when attendees and occupants are
non-residents.
The loophole is that an investment in a low income community business is only
one of the types of qualified investments. Other investments can occur without a
required commitment to an enterprise like a QCB with the 50% community income, or
other community services requirements.113 That type of connectivity with the target
community should be required of all entities seeking to qualify for the subsidy. The
convention center would not qualify if the majority of its income were derived from
visitors attending a convention. An opera house would not qualify if the bulk of the
revenue was from outside the community.
(2) CDE Mission Clarity
The current NMTC statute is ambiguous as to a CDE’s intended beneficiaries. As
noted in the background section of this article, there are three requirements that must be
met for a CDE to be qualified under the NMTC program, two of which are vital to this
discussion. First and most importantly, its primary mission must be serving, or providing
investment capital for low-income communities or low-income persons.114 Arguably the
conjunctive “or” allows a construction that could mean a project for the low-income
“community” is broader than, and equal in status to, a project for low income “persons”.
In other words, a project for an opera house could benefit a broader category of residents
within the “community” like new entrants, who are not low income. A doctor with
income of $400,000 annually who works at an inner city hospital could be within the low
income community, but still not a low income resident. Conversely, if the only
descriptive beneficiaries were “low income persons”, it would far more difficult for the
doctor to be a primary beneficiary of the subsidy.
To avoid ambiguity and to fulfill a goal of qualitative revitalization, this article
recommends that the NMTC regulation simply delete “low income community”. The
benefit should be determined as of the date application for an allocation of funds from the
CDFI is made. Under such a definition, the loophole is closed. Those persons not
experiencing the adverse affects of a blighted condition would not have projects built
primarily for their benefit. The CDFI could then clearly disallow an investment designed
whether owned or leased, must be within any low-income community, I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(ii); A
substantial portion of the services performed for the entity by its employees must be performed in a low-
income community, I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(iii). As to entity types, the QCB can be a corporation, (including
a non-profit), a partnership, or a sole proprietor. Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(4)(i)(ii).
113 An investment is still qualified even if it is a loan to another CDE, or purchase of a CDE loan. I.R.C. §
45D(d)(1)(B)&(D).
114 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A).
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for a 10-story condominium unit where the minimum price for a one bedroom unit is
$400,000. 115
(3) Demanding an Invitation to Your Own Party
Through CDE Board Influence
The requirement that a CDE must maintain accountability to residents of low-
income communities also provides options that weaken its effectiveness. The
accountability standard is confined to low income resident representation “on any
governing board of the entity or on any advisory board to the entity”.116 Again the
conjunctive “or” allows for ambiguity or a broader interpretation that could weaken the
participatory role of those residents. If a CDE has the flexibility to relegate low income
persons from the target area to a mere advisory board, those residents can be
marginalized by having only advisory powers. Though such funds are designed
specifically for their benefit, the advisory powers are essentially no more than a muffled
voice and virtually no representation on how these important federal funds are used. It
should also be remembered that these same low income residents are taxpayers too and it
is also their money at stake. Under the current regulatory language, a performing arts
center could change its original diverse repertoire of performances to only ballet even if
the majority of low income persons within the low income community vehemently
object. If the advisory board language is stricken, the ambiguity and unintended
consequences go away as well.
Allowing the target low income residents a true voice in project decision-making
also allows a fair chance for eliminating conflicts with gentrifiers before they arise. If the
target residents sign off on projects, the CDE and its investors will presumably only be
able to construct projects the target population already considers acceptable. Thus
gentrifiers are not put in the position of being at odds with the target community. It is
entirely possible that the targeted low income community and gentrifiers actually agree
on certain project types. This regulatory remedy has such potential to be curative,
advisory board provisions should be afforded the same care in drafting as a nonprofit
corporation’s its board of directors. 117
Arguably the question of relative influence of an advisory or even a mandatory
board such language could be left to the parties of each transaction under the
“contractarian” theory. Under that theory the marketplace should be free to establish its
own agreements and the NMTC statute and regulations should be relegated to a default
role, applied only when the agreements of the parties to the transaction are silent on the
relevant issue. 118 The current NMTC regulations and statute appear to operate under that
115 Id.
116 I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B). The third requirement is that the CDFI must certify the CDE. I.R.C. §
45D(6)(c)(1)(C).
117 Upon election or appointment to a board of director position, a low income community resident would
be imbued with a fraction of management powers of the CDE, including but not limited to the right to
participate in decisions pertaining to the CDE mission, overall policy direction, types of projects that are
consistent with that mission. See the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act, Code §§ 13.1-803 and Stewart v.
Lady, 251 Va. 106, 110 (1996).
118 Also known as the nexus of contracts model, the theory is that a business organization is most
fundamentally a “nexus of contracts” amongst those who generate goods and services, not a single entity
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model. The CDE and the target residents are left to their own devices and relative
influences on each other to determine just what role the low income community shall
have in decision making for the CDE or the projects it undertakes. There is no statutory
or regulatory mandate as to the extent of low income community participation.
But even when parties are left to their own devices, statutory and regulatory
provisions have historically stepped in when parties use that contractual freedom to
thwart the intent of the legislation or otherwise fail to do what is fair and equitable.119
One analogous circumstance is the Congressional action to curb abusive tax shelters.
Promoters of certain types of transactions took advantage of existing tax laws to create
losses far in excess of the economic reality of the transaction (i.e. losses on paper, but
without any potential financial loss). The use of huge deductions significantly reduced
taxable income far beyond congressional intent.120 To close the loophole and stop the
abuse Congress passed provisions both procedural and substantive.121 Included in the
legislation was the creation of a concept of “potentially abusive tax shelters” where
promoters of tax shelter transactions were required to keep lists of customers and register
shelters with the internal revenue service.122
The federal governmental interest in tax revenues particularly weighs against a
pure contractarian model. An abuse of deductions or tax credits reduces the tax revenue
otherwise owing to the Treasury. That results in less revenue available for public
services, inter alia, which therefore shortchanges the taxpayers. The federal government
has the obligation to direct tax dollars to an intended purpose. In the case of the NMTC
program, if over $2 billion of taxpayer funds are being used as incentives for the wealthy,
rather than the low income residents that Congress intended as beneficiaries, that too is
an abusive diversion of a federal tax dollars. It leaves fewer funds for the intended
purpose of inducing greater private equity into target communities. The lost funds have
multiple adverse affects because those subsidies are also designed to reduce public fund
dependence by those low income communities. The subsidy is only a match to light
private funds designed to increase the quality of life of the target populations. Thus, the
co-opting of funds for a few who are without need increases the federal wasting of
resources, diminishing the value of the taxpayer’s contribution to the Treasury.
Accordingly, certain disclosure requirements or restrictions could be infused into
the NMTC regulation. Akin to the tax shelter concept of protecting against potentially
abusive shelters, the comparable term in this context is the identification of Problematic
Purposed Projects. Based on certain criteria that red flag a potential abusive project type,
created by statute. See Robert W. Hamilton & Jonathan R. Macey, Cases and Materials on Corporations,
including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies (9th ed., Thompson & West 2005)
and David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnership: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 367 (2002).
119 To protect Kansas farmers from bogus investments (termed “a piece of blue sky”) the Kansas
legislature passed a security statutory regulation. See Paul G. Mahoney, the Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws:
A test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. ECON. 229 (2003).
120 See discussion of abusive tax shelters in James J. Freeland, Daniel J. Lathrope, Stephen A. Lind &
Richard B. Stephens, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 498-499 (11TH ED., FOUNDATION PRESS
2000).
121 Substantively Congress disallowed the artificial losses by capping losses from certain income producing
activity or a trade or business to the amount the taxpayer had at risk, e.g. where taxpayer may be personally
liable. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1).
122 I.R.C. § 6112(a)(b).
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the CDFI can be alerted to those CDEs that escaped detection during the application and
allocation process. One such red flag is when a board of low income residents, be it
advisory or governing, objects to a proposed gentrified upscale project. If, prior to
construction of a real estate venture, the CDE was required to submit objections that
reach a majority vote to the CDFI , the disclosures could assist auditors in an
investigation as to whether the project in operation violates the spirit or letter of the
regulations or statute.
Another disclosure requirement could be a mandatory Mall of Needs compilation
by low income residents.123 The Mall of Needs for a target community would be
whatever the community determines to be of greatest need, e.g. affordable housing,
charter schools, pre-school educational facilities, health care clinics for the diseases most
untreated or in particularly acute susceptibility among the residents. With a baseline so
established, a project proposal that varies materially from the established needs would be
subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The threat of losing those credits through required
disclosures, meaningful penalties and enforcement could be an effective deterrent against
the creation of problematic projects.
Even if legislation was not passed to mandate low income residents on a board of
directors, an advisory board with teeth is a viable alternative. The regulations are silent
however on the following:
1. The number of advisory board members (or a corresponding percentage).
2. The criteria for selection of advisory board members.
3. The assurance that recommendations on material issues can be submitted to CDE
decision-makers.
4. Good faith requirements on the CDE to consider advisory board
recommendations.
5. Penalties to the CDE and remedies to the residents if the CDE fails to comply
with provisions relating to the advisory board.
Since CDE and investor decisions are easily based on profit motives and
investment return there is also skepticism as to whether any significant community input
will actually occur. 124 The regulations should accordingly incorporate best practices
models for corporate advisory boards into the NMTC CDE certification requirements,
including those committed to principles of social entrepreneurship.
(4) The “Qualified Business” Exclusion of Project Types
Outside Core Interest and Needs Assessment.
As will be discussed below, Congress specifically eliminated certain types of
business ventures from being eligible or qualified for the NMTC subsidy. Expanding
those exclusions is recommended in this article. When Congress defined a “qualified
business” under the NMTC program, it excluded the establishment of residential rental
units, i.e. housing projects. 125 Also specifically excluded are businesses that hold
123 See Table C, Properly Purposed Projects.
124 See Forbes, supra n. 22, at 198, and Dimitri Pappas, A New Approach to a Familiar Problem: The New
Markets Tax Credit, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 323, 325(2001).
125 I.R.C. § 45D(2)(c)(3)(A), Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(5)ii.
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intangibles for sale or license,126 or operate a golf course, country club, massage parlor,
hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack, or other gambling facility.127 Also excluded are
highly profitable farming operations.128 In enumerating those exclusions Congress
expressed its intent to eliminate certain types of projects that may fall outside the low
income revitalization. If a type of business cannot be a qualified business it cannot be part
of the chain of transactions that leads to a tax credit. So while rural low income
communities are certainly planned beneficiaries of tax credit investments, Congress
fashioned the law to protect against unintended beneficiaries such as farm businesses that
already have assets in excess of a $500,000.00.129 That is obvious indicia of the intent to
exclude those investors and CDE’s who primarily see dollar signs over help signs for low
income residents. Similarly, golf courses, gambling facilities, and country clubs are
excluded as a matter of congressional urban tax policy. It was congressional judgment
that golf courses and country clubs are not truly designed for the target population of low
income residents.
Congressional judgment could also be used to eliminate other accoutrements of
opulence – venues for opera, ballet, and symphonies, high priced condominiums, art
galleries, hotels, and convention centers - all of which have received the NMTC federal
subsidy.130 To close the loophole for such Problematic Purposed Projects, this regulation
can either simply add those project types to the list of prohibited businesses and/or put a
fair market value ceiling on the project as it did with farming projects. The existing
business operation exclusion could be amended to incorporate the following language:
“Any trade or business where, unless decided otherwise by a mandatory
community board, the principal activity is a venue for opera, ballet,
symphony orchestras, art galleries, hotels, convention centers, mixed use
condominiums, or substantially similar business operations where the
aggregate fair market value of assets owned or leased for the project by
the taxpayer at the close of the taxable year, or on average during the
taxable year exceeds ________.131
Consistent with other regulatory amendments noted above, if such a prohibition
was contained in the Regulations, the CDFI would have a clearer basis for auditing and
eliminating such Problematic Purposed Projects. Since the CDFI is required to monitor
whether its award allocations are used for projects consistent with the congressional
goals, amendatory language should be a valuable asset in carrying out its oversight
function.
126 Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(5)(iii)(A).
127 Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(5)(iii)(B).
128 Id. The provision is that as of the close of the taxable year, the sum of the fair market value of the
farming assets, and the taxpayer’s aggregate value of leased assets exceeds $500,000.
129 Id.
130 These findings are from the author’s review of CDFI profiles through four rounds of allocations to
CDEs.
131 The ceiling amounts are not incalculable. Congress already provided a ceiling for farming operations
was $500,000. It can just as easily exercise its judgment in other categories. The CDFI may have enough
project history within various low income communities to establish fair market value amounts based on
such factors as project size, target community income level, stated protect types and goals from the target
low income residents through board of director statements, or otherwise.
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(5) “Low-Income Community” Clarification to
Match Intent to Primarily Benefit Low Income Residents
As previously stated, the NMTC mandates that a CDE must have a primary
mission of serving or providing equity capital for “low income communities or low
income persons”. Similar to the need for carefully drafted definitions of the entities that
prevent unintended consequences, the definition of the low income community should
also be narrowly drawn. As noted above, the definition of low income community could
simply be synonymous with low income residents or be deleted entirely. Then there can
be no doubt that the “community” truly means the existing low income residents of the
community rather than the new financially well healed entrants to that community.
Another amendment to close loopholes in the definition of the low income
community is to tighten the census tract criteria. Currently, a census tract with poverty
rates of 20 percent qualifies as a “low income community” in a metropolitan area.132 If
instead, the poverty rate with a census tract had a floor of 30 or 40 percent of the
community, lower income residents would have to comprise a higher percentage of the
tract to qualify.133 As an additional safeguard, the CDFI could hire demographers with
the type of expertise used to analyze the fairness of federal congressional districts,
pinpointing the percentages of various groups within a district when redistricting issues
arise, to examine questionable circumstances within a census tract. If, as one Federal
Reserve Bank examiner stated,134 there is a narrow segment of high poverty rates within
an otherwise affluent area, this article suggests a case by case review to vary the general
census tract criteria to avoid over inclusiveness. The NMTC statute could be amended to
allow that flexibility in individual cases.
(6) Increased Accountability
Through Recapture of the Credit
The forgoing proposed amendments to the NMTC law are designed to change
behavior of certain investors and entities, i.e. discourage federally sponsored
gentrification. When changing behavior is the goal of amended language, it is more
likely to be effective as a remedy if the failure to change behavior has adverse
consequences for noncompliance – in a word – accountability. The primary tool in the
existing NMTC law is a recapture (i.e. a retroactive forfeiting) of the tax credit.135
The recapture currently occurs when any of the three following events occur: (1)
the CDE loses its status as such (2) the proceeds of the equity investment to the CDE are
132 I.R.C. § 45D(3)(e)(1)(A).
133 Observers of the NMTC program in its infancy also recognized the issue. As a Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland examiner stated: “Poverty rates take into consideration the number of individuals in a family,
whereas median family income does not. While low or moderate-income tracts are more likely to have
poverty rates over 20 percent, it is possible to have high poverty in a middle-income census tract. For that
reason, New Markets funds may be invested in areas with high poverty rates that are not necessarily low –
or moderate-income communities.” Connie Smith, New Market Tax Credit Investments: An Examiner’s
Perspective, Community Investment Forum, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, p. 5.
(2003).
134 Id.
135 I.R.C. § 45D(g).
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improperly used outside of the required use for qualified investment purposes, or (3) the
CDE redeems (takes back) the equity investment for other qualified use.136 Thus, if a
CDE no longer has as its primary mission serving low income persons or the low income
community or the CDE fails to use a low income resident advisory board, it could lose its
status and the tax credits would be recaptured. If the prior suggested amendments were
incorporated in the statute so low income residents must be served primarily without
community definitions expanding beyond them, and the boards truly allow decision
making participation to those residents, then the recapture provides the accountability
standards advocated in this article.
Similarly, if the qualified equity investment (QEI) is only allowed for the
“qualified business” that eliminates the Problematic Purposed Projects, then only
Properly Purposed Projects would be qualified businesses. Any investment in the hotels
and convention centers, and other enumerated upscaling projects of gentrification would
be non-qualified, and the tax credit recapture hammer would fall on the investor. Those
provisions appear to be adequate deterrents to investing in outside of Properly Purposed
Projects. To provide a catch all provision, like a default and termination clause in
commercial contracts, the recapture clause could simply state the failure of the CDE to
comply with provisions concerning Properly Purposed Projects and the target
community’s needs assessment is cause for recapture of the tax credit (default) and unless
cured within a specified time or by certain curing actions, the credit will be lost.
The recapture has teeth built into the statute and appears loophole free, assuming
the proposed amendments are made. The recapture occurs at any time in any tax year
upon the happening of any of the triggering events. The amount of the credit recaptured
increases the investor’s tax, and no deduction is given for the recaptured interest.137
(7) Safeguards Against Overleveraging the QCB
Since the QCB is the small business within the NMTC program that actually
serves the target community,138 its economic health is vital to efficient use of the
federal tax credit subsidy and achieving the goal of revitalizing the community. Like
most typical small businesses, QCBs are financed with a combination of debt and
equity. 139 There are admittedly some positive aspects of incurring debt.140 Proponents
of debt financing as an incentive to efficiently manage the business have axioms that
136 I.R.C. § 45D(g)(3)(A)(B)(C).
137 The credit recapture amount is the decrease in credits allowed for all taxable years as if the NMTC had
not been granted, plus interest. I.R.C. § 45D(g)(1)(A)(B).
138 The QCB is required to derive over half of its income from and provide goods or services to the target
community. Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1).
139 As finance terms debt and equity are forms of “capital” used to fund the business enterprise. The
principal distinction between the terms being that debt refers to borrowed funds, where fixed obligations
must repaid with interest, while equity refers to amounts contributed by owners and investors (e.g. cash).
Debt is a fixed claim against the business assets that must be repaid, while equity is a residual claim against
the company where the equity owner has a claim on what is left over after the fixed debt obligations have
been paid. See Hamilton & Macey, supra n. 118, at 313-314.
140 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Am.
Econ. Rev. 323 (1986), n. 5 at 67.
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essentially state that the challenge of producing sufficient cash flows or default
motivates owners to work harder than counterparts in less leveraged firms.141
This theory has been criticized as an oversimplification since it should not be
assumed that owners or managers are predictably going to respond to this risk by working
harder.142 Indeed, proponents of debt incentives admit “the manager or owner’s fear of
not meeting the debt service (falling through thin ice) does not always lead to superior
performance; it may instead lead to a fatalistic sense that effort might be wasted in a
futile cause.”143
A prime illustration of the dangers of debt is found in the tantalizing quest for
leverage. Leverage is the ability of a borrower to earn more on the borrowed funds that
the cost of the borrowing.144 Overleveraging at its core is the incurrence of debt beyond
the capacity to pay it. Empirical studies reveal that higher goals (e.g. an overly ambitious
high cost real estate development), typically result in the owners carrying higher levels of
debt (“debt service”). To meet that debt service, higher cash flow production is required.
Those cash flow demands can increase the risk of financial failure. And if goals are too
difficult, perceived risks can in turn cause business owners to have a declining
commitment to achieving those goals – a downward spiral where the next project or
financial issue is met with greater reluctance to accept similar goals and a lesser
commitment that those goals can be achieved.145 There is a growing body of literature
that psychological cycles of failure result from such unrealized goals.146 A “falling
through thin ice” syndrome is not uncommon.147
This author’s review of financing structures reveals great potential for
overleveraged QCBs. Many NMTC CDEs require multi-million dollar thresholds for
project size to justify the high transactional fees to law firms, accountants, and
consultants in structuring the transactions.148 Based on a sampling of NMTC allocations
established through the four rounds of awards to date, over 50% of the awards have been
$50 millions or greater, with some as high as $150 million. 149 This author suspects most
QCBs are not currently able to secure the requisite amount of equity financing to compete
at that level, and must rely on debt to participate in the transaction. In many of the
financing structures reviewed, the QCB is essentially a borrower rather than a full fledge
141 George G. Triantis, Debt Financing and Motivation, 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1323 (December 1997), citing
Jensen, supra n. 140, at 323, and Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 183 (1991).
142 Id.
143 31 U. RICH L. REV. 1328. Specifically, overleveraging creates a “crisis atmosphere”. Jensen, supra n.
140, at 323, n. 5 at 67.
144 Hamilton & Macey, supra n. 118, at 339.
145 31 U. RICH L. REV. 1336.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1333, citing Edwin A. Locke, Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives, 3 Org.
Behavior and Human Performance, 157-89 (1968). Of course, aggressive goal setting does not always lead
to financial ruin. The practice can stimulate planning and strategy development, and that higher levels of
management performance can occur when the challenges are perceived as “just manageable.” Id. at 1335-
36.
148 Id. at 1334, citing Gilbert Brim, Ambition: How We Manage Success and Failure throughout Our lives
32 (1992).
149 The author sampled all CDFI profiles from round two (2003-2004) and round three (2005).
http://www.cdfi.gov/what_we_do/overview.asp. In 2005, 64% of the awards for over $50 million, where in
round two over 49% were in that range.
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equity partner in the transaction. Some transactions have even placed the QCB in the
position of receiving a 100% loan, and no cash or other equity at all.150 If the CDE sets
project size and cost goals beyond the capacity of the QCB, the QBC is a likely to overly
rely on debt financing. That results in the overleveraging and consequential growing
likelihood of not meeting the goals of paying the debt service with related psychological
downturns in motivation and performance. If the QCB is overleveraged the owners are
more likely to perceive an inability to meet that debt service, and as a result a declining
commitment to the project. The outcome could obviously be a business failure. Thus, a
high debt structure could be anathema to the financial structure of a NMTC transaction.
If failure occurs due to overleveraging, the overall loss is not just an economic
loss of an enterprise, but also the loss of the value of the individuals to the community
(personally and professionally). These “negative externalities” include the destructive
effect of the firm failure on the future motivation and production of that QCB owner.151
The NMTC target community also bears a loss of resource commitment.152 Thus, this
potential loss of the QCB and the firm owners due to “motivational externalities” from
overleveraging of debt should be discouraged “as a matter of public policy.”153
As the NMTC program is a governmental program, funded with public dollars for
a public benefit, it is therefore fair game for CDFI regulation. The CDFI can monitor
debt ratios. It can publicly encourage NMTC applicants to carefully construct a financing
model that does not jeopardize the QCB. The CDFI could even provide the ultimate
incentive of including in its award criteria a review of the CDE’s proposed debt-equity
mix. That would be consistent with also advising the applicants that favorable
consideration would be given to Properly Purposed Projects over Problematic Purposed
Projects. The underlying theory is that if the projects with the greatest benefit to the target
community are smaller in financial scale, there should fewer overleveraged transactions
for the QCB. If the structure appears to be overleveraging the QCB, the CDE applicant
should be viewed less favorably than a CDE applicant that builds a financing model that
minimizes the financial thin ice that unduly puts the QCB at risk of failure.
Implications for Urban Tax Policy
The United States tax system raises revenues from its citizenry in large part on the
fundamental principle that those with a greater ability to pay must pay more than those of
lesser resources.154 That is why progressive tax rates were established, requiring those
with greater taxable income to be in higher marginal rates, paying a greater percentage of
150 See the Clearinghouse NMTC, LLC transaction described infra, note 162.
151 Id. at 1328.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1329.
154 See William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman & Daniel N. Shaviro, Federal Income Taxation, 6-7 (ASPEN
PUBLISHERS 2003). This “ability to pay” theory could arguably mean a mere convenience in paying where
those with more liquid assets (cash) pay more than those invested in illiquid assets. Under that theory, true
wealth could more easily be disguised and misrepresented. The other notion is the ability to pay is more
directly aligned with overall wealth and well-being. Under that theory, those with greater resources, liquid
or illiquid, pay more because the resources are greater, though it may be inconvenient to retrieve it.
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taxable income than those with lesser taxable income. 155 The corollary is that those in
greater economic need are to pay less in federal income tax. If a federal subsidy is
allowed to benefit those taxpayers who have the greater ability to pay, i.e. investors in
gentrified projects who receive the tax credit subsidy, the real benefit flows not to those
in greatest economic need, but those already with wealth and resources. And it is the
average American taxpayer with lesser resources that picks up the tab for the gentrified
multimillion dollar projects by paying for the billions of dollars in subsidy. That was not
likely the intent of Congress when placing the NMTC legislation in the internal revenue
code, and it is inconsistent with long standing principles of federal taxation.
Our tax system does not use the internal revenue code for the singular purpose of
raising revenues for the public good. The Code is also a vehicle for encouraging certain
congressionally approved behavior among taxpayers in accord with certain established
values. Congress, for example, wanted to encourage home ownership. Homeowners
receive a “subsidy” (i.e. deduction) for paying interest on home mortgages and for paying
local property taxes on a home.156 A renter could theoretically receive a deduction, but
the value of renting was not considered as valuable an interest, and thus no deduction to
encourage that activity.
Conversely, Congress has decided that it will not provide tax benefits through
deductions to those who are involved in personal “consumption” expenditures, like a self
employed groundskeeper who may deduct expenses for mowing activities for a golf
course client, but not for mowing his own lawn.157 Similar personal non-deductible
consumption expenditures include the cost of gasoline to buy groceries for the household,
or paying for the grooming of a pet, or paying interest on vacation loans or credit
cards.158 These are generally “wants” not needs. There are exceptions, but those are
typically because Congress determined that though an item was personal, there was also a
higher value in society placed on the item as a “need”, not merely a leisure or
convenience activity generating the expenditure.
A tax credit is a benefit even greater than many deductions.159 But if tax credits
designed for low income residents instead flow to wealthy investors from gentrified
projects the primary beneficiaries will not statutory target population, but rather those of
greater leisure, for their consumptive convenience and wants. That is also inconsistent
with federal tax policy, as formulated historically and as applied in this context.
And while it is arguable that the tax credit incentive could include gentrified
projects to increase tax base and provide jobs, it is wiser policy to narrowly construe
those items that draw down the federal treasury. It is well established that whether
domestic programs are financed with direct expenditures or with tax expenditures in the
155 The progressive income tax exists when the rates of taxation (percentage paid on certain ranges of
income) rise as income rises. So the higher ones income the greater proportion of income is taxed. See Id.
156 See I.R.C. §163(h) for the deduction for interest paid on a principal residence. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 eliminated deductions for interest paid on borrowed money for personal items such as vacations and
automobiles. Real property taxes are a personal itemized deduction under I.R.C. §164(a)(1)
157 For a discussion of the theory of consumption, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation,
184-190 (10th ed., Foundation Press 2005).
158 See I.R.C. §163(a)&(h).
159 Tax credits receive a full dollar for dollar value reduction in tax liability whereas various itemized
deductions that have certain percentage floors or ceilings that reduce the benefit. See I.R.C. § 67 for
miscellaneous deductions and § 68 for deduction examples, and tax credits like the NMTC at I.R.C. § 45D.
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form of exclusions, deductions, or credits, the effect on the federal budget is the same.160
Every credit and deduction takes money out of the Treasury that would otherwise be used
for roads, war efforts, and the handicapped. The more that funds are withdrawn, the
greater the burden on the American taxpayer to provide additional replacement funding,
and the greater the potential for a federal deficit, with the adverse economic
consequences that could follow. Another reason for narrowing the availability of credits
from a tax policy perspective is that tax credits add to the complexity of tax law and can
undermine fairness in the distribution of tax burdens.161
Another rationale for narrowing the tax credit is the evidence that financially well
healed entities would make the investment even without the subsidy. The evidence is
found in analogous tax incentives offered by states and municipalities. Various state and
local tax incentives (e.g. credits for employing local persons, exemptions, and abatements
from property taxes), like federal tax credits, are governmental tax benefits given to
induce the business to invest and do business in a particular venue. Economists, social
scientists, and legal scholars have found only marginal links between a tax incentive and
increased economic activity in the area by large corporations.162 After nearly 30 years of
research, the conventional wisdom is that various other economic factors have more
impact on the investment decision by multistate corporations than the economic value of
the tax benefit.163 A corporate executive has candidly admitted the tax benefits were
merely “a little extra cream on top.” 164 Skepticism abounds as to whether state tax
incentives lure the wealthy corporations with tax incentives is cost effective for the
state.165
The NMTC award winners for many of the gentrified Problematic Purposed
Projects are banks, or subsidiaries of banks.166 In light of the above research, isn’t it also
likely that the NMTC CDEs for problematic projects would also have made the
investment in a multi-million dollar convention center without the tax credit? The same
non-subsidy factors of other corporate executives, like quality of workforce, and
regulatory environment may also be primary decision-making factors for the major CDE.
If lesser cost effectiveness exists among the CDEs of Problematic Purposed Projects, then
offering the subsidy to such entities should be eliminated or minimized. That would free
up the funds for either a reallocation to Properly Purposed Projects or a reduction in the
amount of subsidies. In either case, the efficiency of tax credits is increased.167
160 Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits & Issues of Accountability & Equity, 11 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2000).
161 Id.
162 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 391 (1996).
163 Much of the study is codified in a New Your Legislative Commission report. The report concluded that
the quality of labor, proximity to markets and supplies, access to utilities, regulatory environment, quality
of education, and the availability of housing are aggregate factors that have greater impact on whether to
invest in a particular city or region. See 51 Albany L. Rev. 393 (1987).
164 Enrich, supra n. 162, at 392.
165 See Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and Materials, 28 (8th
ED., THOMPSON & WEST 2005) for various cited articles.
166 Supra n. 63. The Louisville Development Bancorp, Inc., that was allocated funds for building a Marriott
hotel and convention center is just an example.
167 Arguably, the non-subsidy factors are also primary for CDEs of Properly Purposed Projects. The
reallocation to those CDEs is still wiser tax policy because the funds are more carefully directed to the meet
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the purposes of the program. The only alternative would be to eliminate the tax credit, which is politically
difficult to justify as an improvement in the quest to revitalize urban and rural low income communities.
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SECTION 2
“I believe the federal government can play a positive role
in helping African Americans achieve the goal of owning
their own business…We’ve provided $8 billion in new
markets tax credits to boost investment and community
development in low income areas.
President George W. Bush168
My translation of the above presidential quote is that “the government is willing
to allocate a tax credit jump start to investors in your business, but it is still your business
to develop, in your community, for your community’s own residents. So it is a self-help
program, with a jumper cable attached.” One problem is lack of knowledge. As stated by
one scholar of the NMTCs, “It appears that the NMTC industry is in large part a
closed financial network. The public does not seem to be aware of its existence.”169 The
public includes a substantial pool of financially able African Americans.
The financial network appears to have garnered over $2 billion of tax subsidies
allocated to the gentrifying projects. That begs the question, “If investors in gentrified
projects should be excluded from the subsidy, what types of investors are better suited to
bring equity investment into the urban core? 170 Section 1 provided a race neutral model
for selecting allocatees. In recommending closure of certain regulatory and statutory
loopholes, Section 1 recommends only properly purposed investors be provided the
opportunity for the subsidy. A Properly Purposed Project could be generated by any
entity that focuses on the low income residents as the primary beneficiaries, regardless of
the race or ethnicity of the investor or the entities that establish the project. No racial
classification or preferences for any ethnic group were presented as governmentally-
imposed requirements.
Yet there may be a further refinement of the investor profile that may bring more
efficient use of the tax subsidy and reduce governmental dependence on such subsidies
over the long term revitalization of the urban core. The thesis in this Section is that a
carefully configured substratum of the African American middle class comprises one
such group of NMTC investors, which I term “Ethnivestors”. These Ethnivestors are so
termed because the ethnic and cultural connectivity with the target community is
envisioned as part of framework of investment decision making.171 As such, the group
168 Speech at the Black Expo, July 14, 2005 at the RCA Dome, Indianapolis, Indiana,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050714-4.html
169 Jones, supra n. 44.
170 Even as of 1970, almost half (48%) of the total African American population (23 million or 11% of the
US population) was concentrated in thirty cities, with over one-third in fifteen cities. Flournoy A. Coles,
Jr., Black Economic Development (Nelson Hall 1975).
171 I use African Americans for modeling, not because they are the only ethnic group with an ethnic enclave
in America, but because they are a long standing group disproportionately represented in the urban core for
which a significant statistical sampling can be foreseen. The application, with nuances, would be the same
for other historically disadvantaged groups in this country who for a variety of reasons, became clustered
into economically depressed ethnic enclaves.
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can establish various efficiency gains, more “bang for the tax credit buck” for the subsidy
program, through ethnic self help techniques exercised historically in this country. Since
the intended beneficiaries are predominately ethnic minorities in a segregated urban
core,172 I claim Ethnivestors are more likely to be committed to the target community’s
long term benefit after the 7 year tax credit expires than investors who are culturally
disconnected from the intended beneficiaries of the credit173 Longer term contributions
from the private sector should reduce governmental dependence in the future for various
reasons to be explained below.
The underlying premise of this inquiry is that a cultural connectivity between the
investors, the community businesses and those core residents can translate into a
comparative cultural advantage over those who are disconnected and that such symmetry
can be in the long term best interests of that community; that ethnicity complements, not
competes with economics because the motivation for investment combines the two, even
if pure profit motives are sacrificed in creating the mix. As will be detailed in Part 1, this
ethnic economics model is asserted now because it has occurred in the past among others
historically excluded from mainstream economic society. The question now is can the
past be replicated in the current NMTC environment.
The NMTC program does not have an indefinite legislative life so this is a
propitious opportunity for such a reconfigured African American middle class on its own
collective volition to be part of the revitalization of the urban core cities through a
revitalization of its own, fostering a reunion of sorts with low income residents of
common ethnicity.174 The accepted definition of ethnicity for this article is “self-
identification in a sociopolitical grouping that has both recognized public identity and a
conservationist/activist orientation.”175
The Ethnivestor model focuses on a segment of the African American middle
class as a prototype. It bears emphasis that it is too simplistic and stereotypical to say all
African Americans with financial resources have the same cultural perspective and
investment motivation in urban America. Like any other American investors, African
Americans will be influenced in varying degrees by other factors. The model determines
first whether the potential Ethnivestor is excluded by various factors that result in being
what I term the Economically Self-Saturated, Economic Satisfied, or Economically
Stunted. Individuals who do not fall within those categories may be Economically
Searching (i.e. searching for the investment that ties social entrepreneurship with the
cultural mission for the investment).176
172 The envisioned cities for this model are major cities with a high concentration of African Americans in
the urban core. Examples include Chicago, with estimated African American population of 983,750, Los
Angeles, (382,606), and New York City, 2,110,683. See US Census Bureau, American Fact Finder,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=.
173 After the 7 year period, the QCB and the CDE are well advised to have a structure flexible enough to
allocate income or loss with new investors without being tied to pro-rata interests.
174 Another round of allocations is anticipated for 2007, with the expectation of raising $3.5 billion, 39% of
which would be allocated to selected investors. See I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1).
175 Margaret D. LeCompte and Jean J. Schensul, Designing & Conducting Ethnographic Research.
WALNUT CREEK, CA, ALTAMIRA PRESS, (1999), p. 24.
176 The Self Saturated includes those so content with individualism that little motivational room remains
for social entrepreneurship. The Stunted may have had such financial failures or internalized restraints from
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Part 1 of this section examines the historical development of ethnic enclaves in
the United States, and how ethnic entrepreneurship gave rise to an ethnic enclave
economy that can provide a valuable template for a modern day Ethnivestor. I maintain
the NMTC target communities are also ethnic enclaves. Part II sets forth the conceptual
precepts and then the Ethnivestor model, including various characteristics and investment
motivations that make an Ethnivestor well suited for a NMTC transaction. Part III is the
application of economic principles to further explore whether the Ethnivestor model may
lead to increased utility for the target residents and the Ethnivestor in a NMTC
transaction beyond that of investor groups not similarly engaged in social
entrepreneurship. Finally, Part IV is the application of the theoretical model to provide
concrete illustrations of how the Ethnivestor more efficiently meets the congressional
purpose of assisting low income residents without marginalizing them in the process.
This discussion emphasizes the importance of small business modeling that incorporates
the experiences of other ethnic enclave economies.
Part I
The Ethnivestor for the Ethnic Enclave
One likely challenge to my comparative cultural advantage theory177 is the
rhetorical question, “What makes you think an African American is motivated any
differently than any other investor whose first priority is to receive an adequate return to
justify the investment?” The short answer is that a properly configured Ethnivestor
should have a different definition of what is adequate based on a different risk and reward
analysis. Before analyzing that issue, some historical context is first required because the
experience of other immigrants provides valuable lessons and insight for the formation of
the Ethnivestor.
When America’s primary immigrant influx at the turn of the twentieth century
were primarily Caucasians, albeit from primarily vast regions of Europe, it was perhaps
easier to conceptualize America as a melting pot of various ethnic groups that will
assimilate into the majority culture.178 The historically popular notion was that such
immigrants would join the mainstream through the generations, and enjoy the bountiful
fruits of America in rough proportion to the extent of assimilation, losing their distinctive
group characteristics as a byproduct. 179 There is now a substantial body of empirical
evidence that immigrant upward mobility has depended on not assimilating completely
into the mainstream, but rather, maintaining a common cultural identity that
“compensates for other disadvantages such as racial discrimination or a lack of sufficient
start-up capital.” 180 Past immigrants have utilized their small businesses as culturally
customized schools for future generations of entrepreneurs and financially independent
professionals. 181 Several case studies in Boston, Massachusetts, a premier modeling site,
external sources that investment may not occur at all. The Satisfied may have concluded they have already
done enough.
177 See the thesis statement in the Introduction, which codifies the notion that ethnicity can be an economic
advantage in a community of co-ethnics compared to investors without the cultural connectivity.
178 Marilyn Halter, New Migrants in the Marketplace, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS PRESS, (1995), p. 2.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 9.
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182 consistently found that those involved in ethnic enterprises not only later became
owners of business themselves, but that future generations also entered the mainstream
through professional occupations as owners, rather than paid staff. The studies revealed
Greeks, Soviet Jews, Haitians, and British West Indian entrepreneurs all gaining in
economic and social resources resulting from family enterprises built on ethnic
foundations.183
Cuban immigrants in Miami illustrate the establishment of successful ethnic
enclaves. In the early 1990’s, one half of the Miami Florida population was of Cuban
origin, and a study found that there were profitable co-ethnic self employed owners with
ethnically aligned employees, and “locational clusters” of ethnic entrepreneurs (e.g.
“Little Havana”) as discrete business districts. 184 The authors concluded that Miami’s
ethnically Cuban economy was “hyperefficient” 185 because of its “vertical and horizontal
integration, ethnically sympathetic suppliers and consumers, pooled savings, and rigged
markets”.186 The evolved term for this economic dynamic is the “ethnic enclave
economy”, consisting of two components: spacial clustering in a location and a critical
mass of immigrant owned business firms that employ co ethnic workers to serve their
own ethnic market and/or the general population.187
Those ethnic immigrants were motivated for entrepreneurship within an ethnic
enclave. By exploring their motivations, can we learn whether a newly configured
African American group can become similarly motivated? An established theory
attributable the Max Weber in 1930, (hereinafter the “Weber Theory”) is that culturally-
based entrepreneurship within the enclave is primarily a reaction to exclusion from the
larger marketplace due to discrimination.188 That is to say hostility from a host country is
a driving force encouraging economic solidarity and increased entrepreneurship among
the oppressed groups, and thus a self-help mechanism for survival and growth.189 More
specific study of the relationship between ethnicity and entrepreneurship brought a theory
of “Middleman Minorities”. 190 That is to say in a capitalist system, a certain class of
182 Id. at 5. There have been numerous case studies in Boston Massachusetts because of an immigration
explosion in the late 1980’s, resulting in the fifth largest influx of refugees and seventh largest total
immigration increase in the US according to the 1990 census. Boston thus was diversifying faster than most
of America without one single ethnic group dominating the increase. One such study by Ivan Light
highlighted the “multiplier effect” of ethnic entrepreneurship. Id. at 9.
183 Id. at 10.
184 Id. at page 29 citing a published case study of Messrs Portes & Boch.
185 The efficiency in the ethnic enclave economy is discussed in greater detail in the section on Application
of Economic Principles.
186 Id. at page 30 citing a published case study of Messrs Portes & Boch.
187 Halter, supra n. 178, at 30, citing a published case study of Messrs Portes & Boch, (Portes 1981, 290-
91).
188 This theory was espoused by the acknowledged founder of entrepreneurship research Max Weber. His
context in 1930 involved religious oppression among German Catholics by Protestants, rather than
ethnically based hostilities. His examples include Poles who had a more rapid advance in Russia than in
their own lands of Galicia. Also noted were Huguenots in France under Louis XIV, the Nonconformists
and Quakers in England, and “last but not least,” the Jews for two thousand years. Importantly, he noted the
movement was into small businesses, as will be recommended in this article as well. Max Weber, The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 43 (CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 1930).
189 Id.
190 This theory is authored in large part in Edna Bonacich & Jonathan H. Turner, A theory of Middleman
Minorities, 38 AMERICA SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 583-594 (OCTOBER 1972). Some recent examples include
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minorities became a “go-between” group, filling a gap between the elite ruling class or
host society and the poorer oppressed masses. They typically were not owners of large
capital enterprises. Rather, through small business formations, they provided a conduit or
negotiating function, passing goods and service as a broker, rent collector, labor
contractor, distributor, or wholesaler from the host society elite to the masses.191 This
fostered the notion of the “middle class” or the bourgeoisie among minorities, with
particular application to the people of African descent in the United States.192
There is application of the Weber theory to the African American experience.
They too responded to racism and oppression to forge self help business activities and in
fact thrived during the years of segregation when it could not depend on upward mobility
from the host society.193 There is now a substantial body of literature revealing that the
first generations of the oppressed group in the hostile host environment provide the most
prolific period of self help ethnic entrepreneurship. 194
Examples of historic African American enclaves emanates from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Atlanta, Georgia. In the late 1700s, freed slaves developed a critical
mass of small businesses to survive economically, serving black and white clientele. In
the early 1900s, the proliferation continued despite the fact African Americans were
forced to primarily do business with each other for a period after the passage of Plessey v
Ferguson in 1899 with its separate but equal doctrine. 195 By 1911, when segregation
was still in its glory, Atlanta had approximately 2,000 black-owned establishments,
representing over 100 business types. This included a bank, 3 insurance companies, 12
drug stores, 60 tailor shops, 83 barber shops, and 85 grocery stores.196 It is important to
observe that the forced self help entrepreneurship was 126 years before the City of
Atlanta granted its first government contract to an African American owned enterprise.
197 In fact, it appears that in 1929, African Americans were the only ethnic minority
group to compile its own national ethnically separated retail store census, and begged the
United States Bureau of Census to do the same. 198
Weberian solidarity is also evidenced by industry type. With banking in
particular, a hostile host society’s discrimination spurred African Americans to establish
at least 134 banks between 1888 and 1934.199 In contrast with modern times, as of 1986
when principles of assimilation and integration diluted the African American
Asians in East Africa, Japanese and Cubans in the United States, and Chinese in Southeast Asia, all of
whom developed a Middleman group.
191 Id.
192 See John Sibley Butler, Entrepreneurship and Self-Help Among Black Americans 241-243 (S.U.N.Y.
Press 2005).
193 Id at 263.
194 Id.
195 See W.E.B. Dubois, The Negro in Business (1898) and Joseph Pierce, Negro Business and Business
Education (1947) for illuminating text. More recent is Butler, supra n. 192, at 264, here he includes the
systematic establishment of social organizations, religious and educational institutions, both pubic and
private. In one case freedmen raised over $200,000 in 1869 for a schoolhouse and teacher support. Id.
196 Butler, supra n. 192, at 318.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 311.
199See Id. at 319, citing W.E.B. B. Du Bois, Economic Co-operation Among Negroes 111 (ATLANTA U.
PRESS 1907).
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interdependence, there were only 39 African American banks, with total assets of only
12.53% of the total from 60 years earlier.200 Twelve of the 25 banks on the Black
Enterprise Top 100 list were founded between 1895 and 1956, or during the days of
official segregation.201 And each of the top ten African American insurance companies
was established during this proliferation of self-help entrepreneurship or no later than
1960. 202
Obviously, a return to segregation is not advocated, but the economic evidence
from that era leads to the following questions: If self help entrepreneurship had vitality
when African Americans were more directly forced together, can a model be created for
achieving the same result in the current environment? What role can the NMTC play
with ethnic Middlemen of this day? To answer those questions we must describe the
current environment in comparison to the years of forced segregation. From that process,
we may assess which, if any, of the prior economic circumstances have current
applicability. Indeed one similarly is that the ethnic enclaves of the current day may be as
segregated today by ethnicity or class or both than before the Civil Rights movement of
the 1960’s – though not by law. 203
There are however differing aspects of the modern ethnic enclaves that create
daunting challenges to an Ethnivestor economic model. One major factor, tied to core
city segregation, is the lack of commercial institutions. A study of Chicago’s west side
illuminates a circumstance occurring throughout the nation. In that predominately
African American community, 75% of its viable commercial businesses were lost
between 1960 and 1970, and by the 1980’s, its Lawndale neighborhood had replacement
entities that included 48 state lottery agents, 50 currency exchanges, and 99 licensed bars
and liquor stores.204 Importantly and unfortunately, the community was left with only one
bank and one supermarket for approximately 50,000 community residents.205
200 Id. citing the magazine Black Enterprise, June 1988, p. 206.
201 Id.
202 Id, noting particularly the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company founded in 1898, Atlanta
Life in 1905, Golden State Mutual Life insurance in 1925 (Los Angeles) and Booker T. Washington
Insurance Company, (Birmingham Alabama) in 1932.
203 As of March 2002, there were $36 million African Americans in the United States (13% of total), and
over half, (52%) reside in the central city of a metropolitan area. U.S. Census Bureau, Economics and
Statistical Administration, The Black Population in the United States 2 (2003). Public school systems in
major cities are prime indicia that the extent of segregation could not be much worse. In Washington DC,
94% of the children were African American or Hispanic. The percentages in other major cities are similar;
82% in St. Louis, 79% in Philadelphia and Cleveland, 84% in Detroit, and 89% in Baltimore. Jonathan
Kozol, Still Separate, Still Unequal: America’s Educational Apartheid, 311 Harper’s Magazine 1864
(September 1, 2005). The causes of urban segregation in major cities is well documented, including white
flight by the tens of thousands when 2.5 million rural African Americans came north for employment
between 1940 and 1950 and a developing black middle class that left the core cities, creating a resource and
role model void for those who remained. See Butler, supra n. 192, at 267-268. The disintegrated family
structure is another oft-noted factor. See OFFICE OF PUBLIC PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29 (1965) (commonly
referred to as the Moynihan Report) and Joseph F. Shelley, Structural influences on the Problem of Race,
Crime and Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2273, 2280-81 (1993) who cautions about
blaming the victim. A more thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this article.
204 Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A Denton, American Apartheid, Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass 135 (Harvard U. Press 1993).
205 Id.
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A related vestige of segregation that dampens urban entrepreneurial spirit is tied
to failures in federal urban renewal efforts. In response to the blighted condition,
government programs established urban renewal projects that not only rebuilt, but also
displaced or removed people and businesses from prior locations. Thirty percent of
African American businesses that also were swept away by renewal projects never
reopened, and of those who did, 50 percent failed within the first five years. 206 The more
cognizant the African American middle class is of these negative risk factors in the urban
core, the more difficult it is to hypothecate a positive investment strategy that
incorporates that risk.
Integration also is a factor in the entrepreneurship mix. Scholars of ethnicity and
economics contend that the effect of that 1960’s integration meant migration out of core
cities, and caused a phenomenon consistent with other first minority generations – that
the earlier generations facing hostile societal exclusions responded with more self help
entrepreneurship than succeeding generations who had lesser overt “crisis” of equality of
opportunity.207 The sun-up to sun-down work in the business by parents brought a hope
for a better life for offspring, achievable through education and professional occupations,
which led to greater mobility from the urban core to the suburbs. “Like their ethnic
counterparts”, states one scholar, “African Americans, when possible, followed the
tradition of education, acquiring excellent occupations, and move away from the central
city.”208 African American middle class entrepreneurs during the 1930s era produced
56% of the next generation’s “Who’s Who in Colored America” within the professional
category.209
Yet unlike the experience of the segregated South, the migration north did not
lead to the re-creation of the historic African American institutions. Those institutions
provided “historical nurturing and served as launching pads for the adapting to the larger
American society and more fully participating in it economically.210 Without that
tradition, the scholar rhetorically asks, “What are the lessons and values passed on from
former generations? What are the lessons or values which guide the offspring of the
African American Middleman? 211 During the more successful periods of ethnic enclaves,
African American businesses were at the “very center of communities during
segregation” and “there was always a reality that business enterprise was the shoulders on
which to build for future generations”. 212 That magic has yet to be rekindled among
African Americans in the modern urban core of major cities in America.
Perhaps most fundamentally challenging for the modern African American
investor is identity ambivalence. There is the struggle to define oneself contextually in
performance externally among white America, and then internally amongst other African
Americans. Studies on race consciousness involves the extent to which persons of
common race practice a “re-interpretation, re-invention, re-presentation, and re-definition
of one’s racialized identity within the dynamic context of being American [as if] in front
206 Arthur I. Blaustein &Geoffrey Faaux, The Star-Spangled Hustle, 71 (Doubleday Inc. 1972) and Butler
supra n. 192, at 310.
207 Butler, supra n. 192, at 268.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 251-252.
210 Id. at 271.
211 Id. At 270.
212 Id. at 311. See Dubois, supra n. 195.
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of an audience, or public.”213 An evolving model, which is both internal and external in
establishing norms for African Americans, is that of a re-defined notion of “opportunity”
beyond the civil rights legacy of equality of opportunity. Rather, “opportunity is a
concept of enablement rather than possession; it refers to doing more than having.”214 In
the NMTC context, the well-suited African American investor must view the opportunity
to invest in the urban core as enabling him or her to achieve goals beyond pecuniary gain
(i.e. doing something for the community), rather than having more money – a possession.
The investment is a re-invented view of investment to include social entrepreneurship
similar to African Americans during the earlier ethnic enclave and other immigrant
groups.
At the core is an issue of self-identification and solidarity. If a group is not self-
identified, it cannot achieve solidarity on the issues otherwise thought to be common.
This “putative solidarity” among African Americans is viewed by some leading scholars
in the field as requiring a “hybrid” approach, a recognition that although African
Americans are a mosaic in skin tones and ethnic origins, in this country there is a need for
an overarching common identity in part because the label of “blackness” is still so
imposed on them.215 As will be discussed in the modeling part of this article, such a self
identification is part of the criteria of the Ethnivestor in the NMTC transaction.
And finally, even if ethnic solidarity is part of the motivational mindset of the
African American middle class, another challenge awaits – the fragility of staying
there.216 The two pillars of middle class status are income and wealth, the latter referring
to net financial assets with liquidity.217 The loss of either is likely to bring a fall from
grace. Even when African Americans have similar incomes to white Americans within
the middle class, (i.e. when households earn $50,000-plus annually), African Americans
have half (0.52) the net worth as their white counterparts.218 Most African American
213 John O. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: Status Protest from the
Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 99, 109 (2005).
214 Id. at 110, citing Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 26 (1990).
215 Id. at 121. Calmore illustrates the point of self-selected putative solidarity through the comments of
Congressman Barack Obama. Obama is the proud product of an African-born father and mother who is
white from the United States. Obama chooses to be called an African American and identify with the group
struggles. In his words: “The reason that I’ve always been comfortable with that description is not a denial
of my mother’s side of the family…rather, it’s just a belief that the term African-American is by definition
a hybrid term. African-Americans are…mingled with African culture and Native American culture and
European culture…If I was arrested for armed robbery and my mug shot was on the television screen,
people wouldn’t be debating if I was African-American or not. I’d be a black man going to jail. Now if
that’s true when bad things are happening, there’s no reason why I shouldn’t be proud of being a black man
when good things are happening.” Calmore entitles his related discussion “Diaspora Identity and Black
Performance – The Diversity Within: The Barack Obama Challenge.” Id. at 119-121.
216
“Middle class” status, regardless of race or ethnicity, has comprehensively been defined as the
confluence of not only income, but also education and occupation. Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro,
Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality 69 (ROUTLEDGE 1995). The
common attributes include a college degree and either white collar employee status or self employment.
217 Id at 95.
218 Id at 101. Net worth refers to the net financial assets (NFAs) that are income-producing with liquidity,
including securities like stocks and bonds, excluding therefore “paper equity” in home appreciation and
depreciating assets like vehicles. Id at 101. The stark reality is that nearly two-thirds (63.2 percent) of all
African American households have no NFAs. Id at 102. And among the African Americans that have
assets and investments, 73% of the value of their wealth is in consumable assets, like vehicles and homes
that lack the appreciation-liquidity attributes of NFAs. Id at 105. Only 13 % of their wealth is devoted to
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households attain middle class status through employment income, and only if both
spouses are wage earners.219 There is accordingly a dependence on an uninterrupted
source of current joint earnings to maintain middle class status. The majority (62.5%) of
their other pillar – wealth –is illiquid home equity.220 If either spouse loses a job, or is
disabled, or if divorce severs the joint income, middle class status is jeopardized because
there are little in reserves (liquid assets/wealth) to make up for the income loss. In fact,
only 27% of the African American middle class have enough financial reserves to
maintain that standard of living for one month, and less than one in five households can
maintain the standard for three months.221 It is therefore a precarious perch for most
African Americans with current middle class status.
The financial pill for the fragility of the African American middle class is asset
accumulation and wealth.222 Increasing wealth is achieved, according to these theorists,
through “entrepreneurship and business development…and networking to develop capital
and economic opportunity.”223 Developing businesses requires access to capital, and
once again the African American middle class has high hurdles. Generally, the baby
boomer middle class of today who started families after World War II of today had two
significant wealth building opportunities. One was inherited wealth passed to them from
parents who were allowed to participate in a financially gentler era of the 1940s when
wages and savings rates were higher, and housing costs were much lower. 224 Two was
the ability to use that wealth (nest egg) to amass substantial sums through appreciated
value of homes and securities. They were beneficiaries of a tripling of value for housing
units between 1970 and 1980. 225
Today’s African American baby boomers that have now attained middle class
status did not often have parents who were allowed to participate in the aforementioned
equity building. Inherited wealth was not as forthcoming as a springboard for those
purchases so they too could take can advantage of that decade when real estate values
tripled. Hence, they collectively have a meager wealth portfolio. With the lack of
financial reserves through wealth, and thus an overdependence on earnings to support the
middle class lifestyle, precious little extra cash is available for investment.
A related element of wealth building generally lost on the African American
middle class is “cultural capital”. The term is defined as “the upbringing, education, and
contacts that allowed children to get a good start in life and become financially successful
direct income-producing assets. Whites, conversely have just over one-half of their aggregate wealth in
income-producing assets. These findings, and those noted in this paragraph were developed by the authors
from a combination of sources including the US Census Bureau, and the Federal Reserve. The bulk of the
analysis for wealth is drawn from a sample of the US population over 2 ½ years. See pages 55-58 of their
book for additional data base information.
219 Id at 95. A higher percentage of African Americans must have both spouses employed than white
counterparts. One full-time breadwinner supports 67% of the white middle class, while 42% of African
Americans have a single wage earner. Id at 95.
220 Id at 64. White middle class only tie up 43.3 % of their wealth in home equity.
221 Id at 97. By contrast, the white middle class have a sufficient financial nest egg to maintain for 3
months.
222 Id at 190.
223 Id.
224 Id at 64-65.
225 Id at 108.
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and independent.”226 From among white America, many parents and grandparents of
baby boomers had an opportunity to learn about stock markets, and an opportunity to buy
homes in appreciating neighborhoods. Many were wise enough to pass along what they
learned to future generations. The current African American middle class is not starting
from the same point on the learning curve. The lack of exposure, experience, and cultural
capital is evidenced in the current pattern of disproportionate consumer spending and the
lack of wealth accumulation. African Americans make up about 13% of the population,
and comprise over $631 billion in annual earnings.227 However, only 50% of African
American adults own their own homes, while 70% of white Americans own theirs.228
Approximately 30% of the African Americans that earn $100,000 a year had less than
$5,000 in retirement savings.229 When white and black households were compared,
whites saved almost 20% more each month for retirement.230 This is yet another of the
multi-faceted underpinnings of the current state of anemic African American investment
experience. And it is just another of the hurdles to be overcome if a true Ethnivestor class
is to evolve to take advantage of the NMTC program.
Having lain bare some of the challenges facing African American
entrepreneurship, the familiar axiom, “When there is a will there is a way” appears as an
unwelcome default position for the potential African American entrepreneur. The
question is how do we find the way? Is there a collective will among a segment of the
African American middle class? There are certainly some who may assert that no such
motivation exists.231 But to conclude that all 30-plus million African Americans have a
monolithic in investment behavior is overbroad. Transferals of cultural capital and
lessons learned from other ethnic economies can be incorporated into the model for the
envisioned Ethnivestor in a NMTC transaction.
226 Id at 64.
227 See infra, n. 246.
228 National Urban League, State of Black America 2004.
229 USA TODAY (November 19, 2004) citing report of Ariel Mutual Funds/Charles Schwab 2003 Black
Investor Survey.
230 Id.
231 Neoclassical economics focuses on an individual’s self interest, often described as the pursuit of
maximum economic rewards, though not necessarily so. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism 49 (1985). If all African Americans were painted so broadly, they would simply
pursue wherever they could profit the most, regardless of the impact on African American ethnic enclaves.
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Part II
Ethnivestor Criteria
Regarding Ethnivestor criteria, three cornerstone precepts that lay a foundation
for the more specific modeling discussed thereafter: (1) One’s perception of risk, (2) The
degree to which social entrepreneurship is part of the risk analysis, and (3) An
Ethnivestor’s access to investment capital.
Risk Analysis
Established literature asserts that at the core of the analysis of risk is culture and
perception that falls within that culture. According to a leading theorist, “Anything
whatsoever that is perceived at all must pass by perceptual controls. In the sifting process
something is admitted, something rejected, and something supplemental to make the
event cognizable.”232 She concludes, “The process is largely cultural.”233 She developed
over two decades ago a paradigm of cultural constraints, fitting behaviors and outcomes
into a grid with groups designated therein. The intent was to develop a way of identifying
and segregating the causes for the “self-sustaining perceptual blinkers” and biases we all
have, which gives rise to how we perceive our environment and how we view our role
within it.234
Investing too is based on perception, including but not limited to the perception of
risk before one’s money is spent. The typical investor is attempting to increase her
economic well being as a primary motivation for the endeavor – using her money to
make more money. With that quest in mind, she prudently compares one opportunity for
making money with other opportunities before deciding which vehicle best suits her. That
decision requires a level of analysis of risk – what level of risk of losing my money do I
take in that quest for more money. If the perceived risk is less for those culturally
connected with the community in which the business operates, isn’t that investor more
likely to make the investment than one who perceives that same investment as a higher
risk? Someone accustomed to driving in a major city may be more willing, for example,
to bear that risk of accident on a very busy freeway on the Beltway around Washington
DC than a visitor from rural Wyoming who has never driven on the Beltway. The
Wyoming driver is predictably more likely to say, “No, thank you.” to that degree of risk.
Why? The perception of risk and the familiarity with the environment is different, the
culture is different. Similarly, an investor who is unaccustomed to the experience of the
existing urban core housing or commercial market is, like the Wyoming driver, likely to
perceive the risk as higher than the urban businessperson or those culturally connected
with that urban core.
Social Entrepreneurship
Equally important, the economic return may not be as high a priority if the
investor’s goal is to achieve a blend of economic returns and social benefits to the target
community. This incorporates the burgeoning study of “social entrepreneurship.”235 This
232 Mary Douglas, Essays in the Sociology of Perception 1-2 (ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD. 1982).
233 Id.
234 Id. There are differing theories concerning the factors that influence perception and behavior. Douglas
identifies “economic determinists” for the typology that values and beliefs are secondary to and dependent
on economic constraints. As a polar opposite there are those who contend the same values and beliefs are
predicated on free will. Her model is a middle ground between those theories.
235 Lasprogata, supra n. 14, at 67.
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term is defined as the pursuit of innovative investment strategies, including profit-making
ventures to serve a social mission, typically found in the nonprofit sector or within
private hybrid business organizations mixing nonprofit and for-profit social purposes.236
The dual purposes generate a “double bottom line”. 237 The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation apply the concept in controlling approximately $60 billion toward its own
charitable enterprises.238 The Foundation’s underlying goal is improving the lot of the
world’s poor people without regard to their color, religion, or other differences.239 Its
results-oriented approach led to the selection of projects they could actually envision a
meaningful change in the world, such as improving global health through research,
prevention and treatment for AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and vaccine-preventable
childhood diseases.240
The Gates Foundation leverages its investments to achieve that double bottom
line. Its concept is to identify measurable and achievable outcomes.241 The Gates
observed that three million children a year were dying from vaccine-preventable diseases.
According to the World Health Organization, the foundation has saved 670,000 children,
and will save millions more in coming years.242 The true genesis of this social
entrepreneurship model was the Gates mindset to be “audacious”, where they “believe
these things actually can be solved. ” 243 Bill Gates urged his foundation staff to think
“outside the box”.244
It is that type of audaciousness that is required for an Ethnivestor model to
effectively make a difference in the urban core communities. As will be discussed under
the specific Ethnivestor model, the qualified investor must have a similar perspective to
avoid the rigidity of externalities and let the group’s greater good be the guide. When
social entrepreneurship is discussed in that section, these conceptual underpinnings are
incorporated by reference.
Access to Capital
Finally, it is of little value to discuss a model for investors if it includes those with
little or no money to invest. African Americans have $631 billion dollars in earnings per
year.245 Approximately 343,000 African American households earn between $100,000
and $124,000 annually, and 102,000 African American households earn $200,000 or
more.246 And then there are a few with Gorilla wealth. For example, Usher Raymond IV,
236 Id.
237 Id at 69.
238 Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Rick Lyman, Buffett’s Billions Will Aid Fight Against Disease, 623 N.Y.
TIMES A1 (June 27, 2006). So impressed was the world’s second wealthiest man, Warren Buffett
(Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc), with the social entrepreneurship of the world’s wealthiest man, Bill
Gates, that he donated $31 million to the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, which previously had assets of
an approximate equal amount.
239 Id.
240 MORNING EDITION, “Gates Aims for Major Philanthropic Impact” (NPR June 27, 2006) (Radio
broadcast) (available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 USA TODAY, November 19, 2004
246 US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005 Table 663 (124th Ed. 2004).
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known worldwide musically in the rap genre as “Usher” established his own record
company (Sony BMG) that paid him $20 million in 12 years.247 In early 2005 he earned
another $20 million from his 64-city tour. Usher asserts that only 10% of his income is
devoted to consumer spending, with the remainder invested in fixed income investments,
blue-chip stock, real estate and business ventures. Included in the portfolio is a $1 million
investment in a bank. In February 2005 he became a minority owner of the Cleveland
Cavaliers of the National Basketball Association with a $9 million investment. In his
words, “Wealth accumulation is at the top of the list.”248 There are more African
Americans in America as there are people in Canada,249 and census data reveals a 46%
increase in African American owned firms between 1987 and 1992 compared to a 26%
increase in the larger society. 250The opportunity for investment in the NMTC program
and other vehicles is within reach if the collective vision of a few extends to grasp it.
Specific Model
Generally, a host of influences affects a person’s economic investment goals and
choices. Under the Douglas model, there are essentially two dimensions of control over
an individual’s decision making. One influence module is the impact of forces outside
oneself and outside of the small group of common believers. These are major
principalities such as the government, corporations, and the larger institutional entities
that regulate us in one fashion or another. We must have driver’s licenses, car notes,
mortgages regulated by financial institutions, and employers who regulate employee
behavior for assigned tasks. I term these forces “External Regulators”. As the chart
below depicts, the lower left corner is the External Regulator’s low level of influence on
a person. As the influence grows, that growth is measured vertically so the top left of the
square reflects the highest extent of external regulation.
The other Douglas influence module is the group dynamic where people have
commonality in areas they consider important. The group has a self defined pattern of
allegiance, criteria for admission and varying levels of commitment to that group.251 As I
apply that module to African Americans, indicia of membership as a general group
include the shared historical context of slavery and segregation, cultural aspects that are
either self defining (e.g. speech, music, phrases of art), or ascribed to them in stereotypes
that they commonly rail against, and of course skin pigment. For the specific purpose of
the NMTC investing analysis, I view the group influence as embodying attributes of
being self-motivated, with a non-traditional sense of social entrepreneurship where the
investment goal is not only to make money as an individual, but as importantly, be
committed to the betterment of the ethnic enclaves of the NMTC target community. The
group dynamic is the “Ethnivestor” factor because of the role ethnicity plays in the
investment analysis.252 The extent of influence of this group factor is increased
247 Brett Pulley, Diamonds, Cars and Confessions, FORBES (May 9, 2005) (available at http://forbes.com).
248 Id.
249 There were more than 36 million African Americans in the US as of 2003, (supra n. 213) and 32 million
people in Canada (See Statistics Canada available at http://www41.statcan.ca/3867/ceb3867_000_e.htm.)
250 Butler, supra n. 192, at 325. The raw numbers show 424,165 to 620,912.
251 Douglas, supra n. 232, at 2.
252 The Douglas model used generic terms as part of the notion that the theory is applicable to innumerable
circumstances. She termed the E.I.I. influence as a “Grid” and the Ethnivestor Group as “Group”.
[Douglas, supra n. 232, at 4] Douglas asserts that this grid/group theory “predicts or explains which
intellectual strategies are useful for survival in a particular pattern of social relations.” Id at p. 6. As
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horizontally from left to right. So the greater the group’s influence on the individual the
further to the right that person falls.
From this initial construct, the range of interaction among these influence factors
can be illustrated through four categories, depicted as boxes within quadrants on a grid.
The grid is shown below.
applied to this article, the social patterns and strategies sought to be explained are for NMTC investors with
allegiance to the purpose of assisting the low income residents of urban America.
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Group A: The Economically Saturated
Investor Group A at the bottom left corner represents those with the least amount
of influence from any group dynamic, be it external regulators (low vertically in the grid)
or from within a common internal ethnic group influence (horizontally low at the lower
left of the grid). Accordingly, Group A is highly individualistic, being without a
significant influence from any group. They are less inclined to follow the group
perspective and prefer to “do their own thing.” They are “saturated” by their
individualistic goals, or simply put “self-saturated”. There is little room left to absorb the
social entrepreneurial spirit to sacrifice profits for people. They are less likely to donate
significantly to the NAACP or similar entities unless a corresponding personal benefit
(return on investment) appears likely. Similarly, these persons are less likely to make
personal sacrifices for, and would therefore have less tolerance for the working class
masses as employees in a small business under a NMTC project. Saliently, this category
of investor is least likely to have the Weber-modeled self help ethnic group solidarity for
entrepreneurship in response to a hostile societal host. That self-help model brought the
most successful periods of entrepreneurial success by African Americans in this country.
For these reasons, Group A persons among the African American middle class do not
meet the Ethnivestor criteria and are not the ideal candidates for the transactional entities
on NMTC projects. 253
Group B: The Economically Stunted Through Subordination
Group B from the African American middle class has high controls from external
sources, (vertically high in the grid) but minimal influence from the ethnically inspired
self help group (horizontally low – i.e. on the left of the grid). What prevents Group B
from investing in Properly Purposed Projects is some source external to the investor that
253 The parties to the NMTC transaction are the CDE, the QCB, and the investor. The relationships and
interrelationships are discussed in the Structure of the Credit section, the CDE, the QCB, and the investor.
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has a high level of influence over investment decisions. For example, a career military
person may be so ensconced in the culture of military thinking, that his only investment
comfort is from whatever is available through the federal government’s Department of
Defense. There is the financial ability to invest, but not the perspective to go beyond the
external regulators’ investment choices.
The external source of subrogation may also be a lender. Studies indicate past
financial failures among many African Americans has brought more pessimism than
optimism about future investments, and hence a lesser degree of investment than the
general white adult population. 254 Lending practices of financial parasites and even
legitimate financial firms have led to oppressive debt obligations on African American
investors.255 Once the oppression is internalized (i.e. a secondary self subrogation), the
debt leads to such a level of apprehension and discomfort that the potential investor
becomes gun-shy and his or her investment in Properly Purposed Projects is stunted.
The source for an economic stunted African American investor may not be just
from external sources. External sources can cause an internalization of investment doubt.
The lack of securities investing provides an example. The apprehensiveness about
investing in securities has been tied to several factors, including less exposure to capital
markets, inexperience, and less disposable income which results in a more risk adverse
investment strategy. 256 Considering those factors in combination, African Americans
within this quadrant have been more vulnerable to nefarious wrongdoers that have
consciously targeted ethnic groups. More particularly, African Americans are among
several ethnic groups who have been the target of “affinity fraud” schemes, where crafty
sales pitches of nefarious wrongdoers consciously target ethnic groups that lack
investment experience and appeal to their cultural values and beliefs. The practice has
caused the Securities and Exchange Commission to pursue prosecutions for the millions
of dollars scammed.257 African Americans, among other ethnic groups, also have fallen
prey to “Ponzi” schemes which promise investors high rates of return, only to find the
funds were used to simply pay earlier investors258. Subprime lending has also contributed
to this investment malaise. Upper and middle income African Americans are twice as
likely as low-income Caucasians to turn to subprime refinancing in the real estate
254 Isaac C. Hunt, A Message on Investing, 42 HOW. L. J. 387 (1999) citing a survey by Ariel Funds and
Charles Schwab & Co. noting a lesser rate of investment in securities. It is contended here that those
causes for apprehension also affect the investment risk analysis for other investments such as real estate.
See note 141.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Lisa M. Fairfax, “With Friends Like These…” Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity-Based
Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63, 74 (2001). This source notes that the SEC obtained a
$4 million disgorgement order against a schemer who targeted almost two thousand African American
investors (The “Zurich scheme”). A similar action was brought against Hispanics who fraudulently raised
$1.5 million from over 200 members of the Houston Hispanic community. Immigrants from the Dominican
Republic, people of Middle Eastern descent and German speaking Europeans were similarly targeted. See
also Hunt, supra n. 254, at 389, citing Liz Skinner, Affinity Fraud Scams Increasing, HOUS.CHRON. 2 (Apr.
5, 1998).
258 Id at 389.
8/25/2006 55
market.259 The lack of investing acumen has also left many African American middle
class uncomfortable with their ability to manage debt. 260 So while the sources of
apprehension are externally oppressive, the internalization of doubt still results in a
stunted investment perspective.
There may be many circumstances where it is difficult or impossible to ascertain
the extent of the stunted perspective is due to wholly external sources or self-imposed
restraints. The external and internal sources may be working in tandem. Whatever the
relative mix of external and internal sources, the stunted perspective is real within a
significant part of the African American middle class. Despite a collective $671 Billion in
annual earnings, and 100,000-plus African Americans make over $200, 000, much is
squandered in consumer spending.261 Some 30% of African Americans earning $100,000
annually have retirement savings of below $5,000. 262 The first comprehensive estimate
of African American stock ownership revealed that of the net wealth accumulated by
African Americans, only .09 percent was in corporate stocks. 263 These figures suggest
that many African Americans may currently fall into Group B investors and have not
reached the investment maturity well suited for a NMTC project, though sufficient
income otherwise exists. Such investors, already reeling from a history of bad
investments or otherwise uncomfortable with investing, are likely to perceive a Properly
Purposed Project as high risk and with great suspicion. For some, those prior failures
may be so internalized that the fear of failure stunts any future investment activity that
may be considered risky. The result is that the actor can become unduly passive dooming
oneself to inaction.264
This “what’s-the- use?” attitude has been empirically shown in university student
testing where three groups were subjected to two tests.265 The first test concerned the
ability to turn off loud noises. One group could control the noise through a lever, another
group could not control the noise at all, and a third group had no noise at all. The second
test was to place them in settings where a simple act could eliminate the noise. The group
that had the inability to control the noise at all in the first test was the most passive in the
259 There is a disproportional presence of subprime lending in African American communities, evidenced
by a HUD analysis that over half of all mortgages in those communities were subprime, leaving a Black
borrower five times more likely than white Americans to receive such a disadvantageous loan. Baher
Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57
FLA. L. REV. 295, 328-329 (April 2005).
260 T John Simons, Even Amid Boom Times, Some Insecurities Die Hard – Black Middle Class Gains
Ground, But Still Finds its Situation Shaky, WALL STREET JOURNAL A10 (December 10, 1998).
261 Keith Reed, “State of Black America, Part Two: Our Financial Insecurity,” January 13, 2005,
(http://blackamericaweb.com).
262 USA TODAY (November 19, 2004).
263 Andrew F. Brimmer, Income, Wealth, and Investment Behavior in the Black Community, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 151, 154 (1988). This is not to say African Americans are doomed to investment failure.
There are numerous encouraging signs, including the facts that African Americans are making more money
than ever before, overall earning power is rising. Hunt supra n. 254 at 390.
264 31 U. RICH L. REV. 1337, citing definitions of learned helplessness at 102 J. Experimental Psychol. 187,
187-93; Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, 49-74 (1978).
265 Hiroto, Locus of Control and Learned Helplessness, 102 J. Experimental Psychol. 187, 187-93 (1974).
See 31 U. Rich L. Rev. 1336, citing Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham, Work Motivation: The High
Performance Cycle in Work Motivation, 3 (U Kleinbeck et al. eds., 1990).
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second test, even though it could have very easily accomplished the task.266 Similarly,
bad investment experiences or an otherwise skittish investment perspective can lead to
internal doubt, which in turn leads to a lack of effort to meet the demands of the situation.
This leads to a perceived sense that the individual cannot control the circumstance and
unduly generalizes the failure to new situations. The NMTC opportunity would be one
such new situation. The profile of the Group B investor is one already disconnected from
the ethnic common group and therefore unlikely to heed the call for entrepreneurial spirit
for the cause ethnic enclave. So this investor type wallows in a pity party and self
loathing, stunted from investing in such Properly Purposed Projects. Hence, Group B
investors would not meet the Ethnivestor criteria.
Group C: The Economically Satisfied
Through Structural Success
This group is identified as having a high external regulators (vertically high in the
grid), and also a high internal ethnicity influence (horizontally far to the right). The group
is more likely than Group A or Group B to meet Ethnivestor criteria because of a higher
affinity with the ethnic group influence. The group is however less than ideal for
Ethnivestor status because its investment goals have already been satisfied. Accordingly,
there is no longer an appetite for additional investment, at least of the type to be found in
Properly Purposed Projects under the NMTC program. To illustrate the typology, this
group may include those who have already provided equity capital to Properly Purposed
Projects in target communities. She may have already established and funded
endowments for that community.
The group could also include the corporate executive that has the house,
automobile, other luxuries of choice, and has contributed significantly to both the
NAACP and the country club. By way of example only, there are a few African
American CEOs and approximately 275 senior executives of Fortune 500 companies.267
And there are African American investment banks and asset management firms
substantially in the black, literally and figuratively, with billions of dollars in assets under
management. 268 And as previously noted, over 100,000 African Americans earn more
than $200,000 annually. Apart from possibly a few high cost of living cities, for such
folks, the living is easy – financially speaking. These are well healed people by any
standard. Some of them may be satisfied just where they are, enjoying a peaceful
relatively risk free existence after earning every penny and investing consistent with their
social mission along the way.
So while Group B is unable to invest, and Group A is unwilling to invest, this
group is ethnically influenced, but has concluded that its ethnically inspired investment
mission has been accomplished.269
266 Id.
267Cora Daniels, Most Powerful Black Executives (available at
www.fortune.com/fortune/careers/articles/0,15114,368860,00.html?promoid=email).
268 Id.
269 No empirical studies have been located on this group dynamic. Future ethnographic research can
provide a testing of the theory as will be discussed below.
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Group D: The Economically Searching
This group is the most likely NMTC Ethnivestor because it has individuals with
the highest level of motivation to invest based on ethnic solidarity akin to the Middlemen
from prior generations (horizontally high on the far right of the grid), yet the lowest
interference or dilution of that motivation by external regulators (vertically low at the far
left of the grid). Thus corporate or governmental constraints, or even such traditional
investment vehicles that abhor high risk ventures, would not likely stunt the potential
ethnically-inspired investment.
If the investor links investment strategy solely to individualism, the greater good
of the ethnic enclave will not induce the investment (“economically self saturated”). If
the investor is overwrought by fear of failure, or the investing constraints of traditional
corporate, governmental or financial institution culture, (“economically stunted”), such a
transformative investment strategy is not likely to occur. If the investor has the ethnic
identification to invest, but has already done enough after externally fulfilling
experiences, the investment into ethnic enclave economy would not occur because the
investment was already made (“economically satisfied”).
A high level of ethnic consciousness should also bring a higher sensitivity to
current disparities that have been ineffectively addressed through status quo techniques.
This group therefore is more likely to still be searching for aggressive and innovative
methods to address those issues. It may take such an “audacious” approach in the mold of
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to embrace social entrepreneurship in the urban
core. And this is the group that may incorporate those prior lessons of ethnic enclave
investing in the tradition of the Weber theory over 70 years ago. This group may be best
suited to form a new version of credit associations, utilization of small businesses to
nurture employment for the underemployed African American males, and saliently, it
may embrace, rather than marginalize the ethnic enclave economy. This investor
therefore should be the personification of ethnically-inspired social entrepreneurship.
Since the thesis of this article involves providing an alternative to gentrification
so that the urban residents are not marginalized, the scope of this article includes how the
Ethnivestor can help accomplish that task. Various strategies are discussed in Part IV
regarding the application of the Ethnivestor model to the NMTC transactional scheme.
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Part III:
Application of Economic Principles
Within the general rubric of law and economics, two camps are at theoretical war.
Philosophical pundits in one corner are known as neo-classical economists with a
fundamental premise that each individual will adjust his or her behavior to make rational
choices to maximize whatever causes satisfaction, i.e. self interest. 270 From that premise,
two of the economic principles are that: (2) for a denial of a resource, an opportunity cost
is incurred, which has consequences on wealth of the individual and/or society,271 and (3)
resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if the open market is allowed
to operate without undue interference from the government. That is to say a negotiated
price between two individuals without undue pressures from external sources such as
government price fixing will achieve a more valuable output, through maximizing the
self interest of the buyer. The value is the price the buyer paid. That buyer presumably
sees a value greater than the seller’s economic cost. 272 Under the neo-classical economic
theory, efficiency refers to the allocation of resources to maximize value or wealth.273
In the other corner of legal economic theorists are groups that focus not so much
on individual behaviors as on group dynamics that impact a greater goal of the society –
curing an injustice. One such group is the “environmental justice” movement.274 In their
view, an allocation of resources by maximizing an individual’s satisfaction and utility
through pure market forces is simply inapplicable where the goal is to achieve justice.275
The traditional economic model is inapplicable is because land use is not an
unencumbered market where people are free to choose their desired outcomes. According
to these theorists, social justice is the overarching important outcome, and governmental
270 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3-5(6TH ED 2003). See also the writings of Gary S.
Becker, The Economics Approach to Human Behavior 6-11(1976), Guido Calabresi, Cost of Accidents: A
Legal and Economic Analysis (1960), and Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON 1
(1960). Importantly, the search for satisfaction is not necessarily always economic. It is a function of
utility, and how one attempts to increase it through behavior that achieves a goal of high value. So one
may maximize utility by choosing to pay a lesser price for ground chuck in the face of price increases for
the steak previously preferred. Behavior was adjusted to meet a higher level of satisfaction – the actor’s
perception that it is better to buy a slightly lesser grade of beef for a better price. This “self-interest” is not
argued to only include the negative connotation of selfishness. It could include a mix of personal happiness
and pleasure. In the above example, the self interest in the ground beef purchase could have also been
motivated by remembering that her spouse prefers ground chuck for the dish that was going to be prepared.
Neoclassical economists therefore characterize satisfaction as “utility” to avoid broader commingled
concepts of selfishness and self interest. Posner, supra.
271 The opportunity cost is a benefit forgone by employing a resource in a manner that denies its use. One
who attends college for four years has forgone the money he could have made as an employee over that
period. A homemaker who could otherwise be employed outside the home has incurred an opportunity cost
for the value of her labor, though no pecuniary equivalent is established. Under this theory even sex is an
economic activity since it involves an expenditure of time and effort (resources) in the quest. Id.
272 Id at 9-10.
273 Id. at 11.
274 Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2003).
275 Id.
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intervention may be required to achieve a more equal distribution of resources (i.e.
distributive justice).276
Similarly, advocates of critical race theory embrace a discourse on the effect of
discrimination by groups on groups of America’s citizenry and criticize neo-classical
economics as “methodological individualism [at] fundamental tension with the concept of
race, intrinsically a group concept.”277 These theorists consider it a fatal flaw of neo-
classical economists to ignore the possibility that victims of discrimination could have
psychic losses as part of the opportunity costs analysis and likewise ignore the
transactional costs for racial discrimination in commercial transactions. 278
What appears common to those adversaries of neoclassical economics is their
prioritization of a social humanistic goal through an analysis of how groups impact other
groups over the science of individual behaviors. One scholar characterized neo-classical
law and economists as those who “seek to make law appear more, rather than less,
scientific and thus avoid references to the humanities”. 279 Indeed, a prominent theorist
of neoclassical economics, Judge Richard A. Posner boldly admits that the theories
advocated are an abstraction, “but abstraction is the essence of scientific inquiry, and
economics aspires to be scientific.”280The counter claim is that “Law is not, however, a
natural science. Even though references to the natural and social sciences can be helpful,
law involves human practices and experiences that are not fully explainable or
understandable in scientific terms”. For the law to be effective, it must address human
need and fairness beyond profit motives. 281
The Ethnivestor model and tax policy implications are a blend of both worlds. On
the one hand it is a design to prioritize a social goal – revitalization of urban core
American to primarily benefit the low income residents, without increased
marginalization. Yet the means of accomplishing that goal includes the infusion of
neoclassical principles of opportunity cost and increasing market based behavior models
so that over time the self help ethnic entrepreneurship (market based) diminishes the need
for public funding for this purpose.
The Ethnivestor model has an implicit premise that a governmental incentive
subsidy alone shall not revitalize urban America in a way that maximizes the wealth of
underutilized resources. Neither can we depend on gentrified projects to do for that group
what it may do for itself. Those underutilized resources are both a segment of the African
American middle class (Ethnivestors) and the urban core residents that are otherwise
being marginalized by gentrified projects. By incorporating an Ethnivestor blended
276 Id. at 1031, 1082. By way of example, one Camden New Jersey neighborhood became the site for
various industrial facilities, including a sewage treatment plant, a trash-to-steam plant, a co-generating
plant, and two contaminated Superfund sites suspected of releasing hazardous substances. Ninety one
percent of the residents are persons of color, poor, and suffer a disproportionately high rate of asthma and
other respiratory ailments. It is a pattern repeated across the country. Id. at 1033. Posner also discusses
distributive justice but as an economic variable. Infra, note 316.
277 Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial Inequality, U. MARYLAND SCHOOL
OF LAW, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2005-37 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=7006860).
278 Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1257, 1284-87
(1991).
279 Robin Paul Malloy, Framing The Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and
Culture, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003).
280 Posner, supra n. 270, at 17.
281 Malloy, supra n. 279, at 18.
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motivation of philanthropy and profit (social entrepreneurship) African American
resources are made more productive, wealth is increased, and through the small business
concentrations and school of entrepreneurship concepts, the resources of low income core
residents are enhanced. The desired result is a more efficient market within the ethnic
enclave.282
To explore the Ethnivestor model in economic terms we return to two important
concepts of utility and efficiency.
Utility
Under traditional neoclassical configuration, “utility” refers to “the value of an uncertain
cost or benefit as distinct from a certain one” and satisfaction garnered from the
behavior.283 The Posner utility configuration is also expansive enough to incorporate the
concept of group. The label used is “utilitarianism”, which is aggregating utility across
persons, treating them as “cells in the overall social organism rather than as individuals”.
As will be discussed below, the Ethnivestor and the Gentrifier investor have a different
sense of utility, both in terms how they define value/satisfaction, and how they view
utilitarianism in their investment decision making. 284
The Posner principle of value as a component of utility is that you value
consistent with what you are willing to risk.285 Importantly, there is no prescription that
one must value pure pecuniary profit to the exclusion of all other motives. Therefore one
can still be motivated by non-financial purposes even if it makes the investment
financially risky. In the Ethnivestor context, it could easily be perceived as a lower
pecuniary risk to build a mixed use condominium unit with restaurants and high end
units. Value is conceived through the buyers - gentrifiers who could afford to pay at a
price beyond the developer’s cost of producing the resource. It would be more risky to
invest in a needs-inspired small business (Property Purchased Projects) that assist
primarily the target poor people within the community. For an Ethnivestor who values the
higher risk for the greater good of the ethnic enclave, the value and satisfaction
components of utility are found by investing in such Properly Purposed Projects. The
social entrepreneurial motivation, though utilitarian in nature is nonetheless his “value”
and utility. 286
282 Arguably, if purely market forces were in operation without governmental regulation or incentives, the
Ethnivestor should come to the aid of the community it has the greatest cultural connectivity. The issue of
whether the pure market based scheme to revitalize the urban community is superior to a federal program is
a fight for another day. Since Congress has provided such an incentive, this author considers it more
valuable to propose a framework that combines private forces with the reality of the NMTC incentive.
283 There are two components to utility that is demonstrated through the classic Posner illustration of a
person having a choice between $1 million outright, or rather a 10% chance of receiving $10 million. One
form of utility is a measure of one’s appetite for risk to determine what that person values most. Do you
take a low risk ($1 million) or do you increase the risk to achieve the greater reward? The risk adverse
person would take the $1 million. This is the value or expected benefit component of utility because the
person valued the $1 million now more than the increased opportunity later. The second concept of utility
is philosophical, meaning an approximation of happiness and satisfaction. Posner, supra n. 270, at 11.
284 Id. at 12.
285 See definition of utility, supra n. 288.
286 In the Posner hypothetical of the person with the choice of $1 million now or 10% of $10 million, the
person taking the $1 million was terms more “risk adverse”. If say the interest rate he received
compensated him for the higher risk, where his total return was greater than if he merely invested the $1
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Conversely the non-Ethnivestor (termed Gentrifier investor) would most likely
invest, if at all, based on maximizing a financial or pecuniary return on that investment.
The gentrifier investor287 would have a different utility - maximizing profit - because that
is what he or she values. The uncertain commodity the gentrifier desires is increased
wealth from a new market – the low income community. The certain item used for
comparison is whatever other investment he could have made in older markets.
Efficiency
Another component of utility is diminishing marginal utility. The concept is that a
commodity means less to someone who already has a lot of it, e.g. second million dollars
to a millionaire is not as satisfying as the first. In economic terminology, those who
already have attained utility (value and satisfaction) from a certain item will likely
attribute less value to getting more of the same. Thus, the utility diminishes as he attains
more of same of whatever he had.288 There is also a reciprocal aspect in that while utility
diminishes for one party of a voluntary transaction there may be a corresponding increase
in utility for the other party to the transaction. Simplistically stated by example, those
who have “a loss of a dollar hurts the millionaire less than the gain of a dollar pleases the
pauper”. 289 In the Ethnivestor context, the Ethnivestor will retain more utility when
investing in the ethnic enclaves than the Gentrifier investor if the NMTC program
prioritizes Congressional goals of helping those in greatest need among the target
community. An Ethnivestor who invests in part to help those target residents should have
a correspondingly higher amount of satisfaction and value because it is tied to
betterments of humanity, not just pecuniary rewards. If the Properly Purposed Project
million on receipt, the risk adverse choice would not “maximize” his pecuniary self interest. The important
concept is that as long as his concept of value was to be risk adverse, he maximized his self interest,
because he essentially defined self interest consistent with that value. Thus, simply making the most money
possible is not always value and thus is not always the definition of utility. In the NMTC Ethnivestor
context, the Mall of Needs type of investments may not generate a maximum financial return, but that is
acceptable if it fits within his concept of value to incorporate non-pecuniary goals like revitalization of the
ethnic enclave and its core citizenry.
287 The gentrifier investor includes those of the same mind who own the CDE or the QCB.
288 Posner, supra n. 270, at 10.
289 Posner is quick to caution that this does not mean redistributing substantial wealth from higher-to lower
income people will increase total utility. Posner’s controversial assumption is that “people who work hard
to make money and succeed in making it are, on average, those who value money the most, having given
up other things such as leisure to get it.” Posner, supra n. 270, at 470. Posner cites no empirical proofs for
that assumption. It could just as easily be that those who have substantial wealth have it because of
inheritance or they were provided greater opportunities to make money from the labor of others. If a partner
in a law firm bills out his own labor at $300 an hour, he could have gross revenues of $2,400 if he bills and
collects on 8 hours of work that day. But if he also derives 50% of the billable time for three associates in
his office (say each bills at $200 per hour for 8 hours that day) his take for the day is an additional $2,400.
Thus, he has doubled his income, not because he worked harder, but because he was in the position to
profit from the labor of others – others who may have outworked the partner, or been just as talented, but
not yet blessed with the leveraging opportunity. The Posner model appears to give no effect to the value of
privilege, class, legacy, or inheritance, but would rather posit only the possibility that the difference is due
to hard work and personal sacrifice as an “opportunity cost” of the wealthy. Just as easily, the opportunity
costs would be far greater for an associate who deserved to be partner but was denied because she was a
woman, or because he was African American, or gay. This again points up the notion that neoclassical
economics is not designed to solve social justice issues, because it fails to explain or measure the
opportunity costs of those who have been victims of such things as discrimination, legacy, and inheritance.
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were mandated under the program, the Gentrifier investor’s satisfaction and value would
diminish more quickly because the financial returns would be more difficult to achieve.
Under neoclassical theory there is an important correlation between “utility” and
“efficiency”. Efficiency is the allocation of resources in which utility and value is
maximized.290 If indeed utility and value is not confined to pecuniary notions of wealth,
then the non-pecuniary value is also part of increased efficiency. It follows that if one
invests consistent with those values, utility should increase, or be reduced at a lesser rate,
if the purposes of that investment are fulfilled. In the NMTC context, if Properly
Purposed Projects are the only statutorily authorized ventures, the Ethnivestor is likely to
achieve greater satisfaction and value from the investment because his investment
behavior is aligned with the projects authorized and purposes of the NMTC program. It
follows that the greater the value and satisfaction, the greater the utility and value. That
allocation of a resource, the investment in the Properly Purposed Project, is therefore
more likely to bring greater efficiency in an economic sense than a Gentrifier investment
in a Problematic Purposed Project that falls outside permitted project goals. A gentrified
investor who seeks primarily individual profit would find more frustration than
satisfaction if he (1) suffers in financial returns, (2) has to remain invested in the target
community beyond the tax credit haven, or (3) is unwilling to hire target residents or
incorporate target community ideas of proper projects, when he really is only interested
in profitability. The lesser satisfaction and value is a lesser utility. The lesser utility is a
lesser efficiency.
To buttress the point, I return to the studies of the Cuban ethnic enclaves in the
early1990s. Researchers concluded that when those of Cuban descent established
locational clusters of ethnic enterprises, hired people from within the ethnic enclave,
pooled their savings in rotating credit associations, and developed sympathetic suppliers
and customer bases, a vertical and horizontal integration occurred (i.e. an ethnic enclave
economy) that became “hyper-efficient”.291 Part of the key findings was that these
businesses employ co ethnic workers to “serve their own ethnic market and/or the general
population”. Importantly, the ethnic enterprises had such a caring perspective about
those co-ethnics that the business becomes a school of sorts for entrepreneurship for
those co-ethnics hired within the ethnic enclave.292 The Ethnivestor model provides for
African American investors a combination of economic resources and an ethnic sense of
solidarity to utilize those gaming strategies of other successful immigrants and African
Americans prior to the integration era, when the self help entrepreneurship was forced by
externalities of discrimination or economic exclusion.
290 Posner, supra n. 270, at 11-12. Again, Posner prefers to shy away from applying efficiency to doing
good for a society and groups within it. In his words, efficiency “has limitations as an ethical criterion of
social decision-making.” Id at page 12. The relevant question is whose limitations? Why not modify an
economic theory to have as its goal, the curing of a social ill, rather than an explanation of an individual’s
self interest. If that creates a “humanitarian” aspect, so be it, since it is humans as a group we hope to cope
with over our earthly existence. Isn’t that the higher priority of a civilized society - peaceful coexistence -
where all people are treated fairly? I would call economic theories that incorporate such motivations
“econo-realism”. If instead the primary purpose of an economic theory is the explanation, prediction, and
intervention of principles that only promote an individual’s self interest, does that theory advance or retard
our movement to be a more civilized society?
291 Halter supra n. 178, at 29-30, citing a published case study of Messrs Portes & Boch.
292 Id. at 30, citing a published case study of Messrs Portes & Boch, (Portes 1981, 290-91).
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One could assert that for such a model to be viable there must be an analysis of
opportunity costs, and that true efficiency cannot occur if the forgone costs exceed the
benefit. 293 The Ethnivestor pays a financial price when investing in a Properly Purposed
Project, a health clinic due to the disproportionate need for sickle cell or kidney dialysis
treatment. Assume the same money could have been invested in some other manner with
a greater financial return. There is an opportunity cost to the Ethnivestor because of the
greater return forgone if monetary return was what he valued. But since the value,
satisfaction, and therefore utility includes the social aspects of the entrepreneurship there
is a minimal sense of loss, if at all. Therefore, there is no material social loss to society,
but instead a private rearrangement of resources from the Ethnivestor to the target
resident within the ethnic enclave. So while validating the general principle of
diminishing marginal utility, the Ethnivestor has less of it because of the match between
the reasons for investing with the results of a Properly Purposed Project.
Application of Utility and Efficiency
The charts below graphically illustrate how efficiencies vary between the
Ethnivestor and the Gentrifier. In Chart A, the Ethnivestor utility is measured on the
vertical pole on the left of the chart. That utility includes all those Ethnivestor
characteristics that motivated the investment behavior, including the desire for increased
well being for target residents, despite lesser financial returns to the Ethnivestor. The
Target Resident294 who receives the benefit of the Properly Purposed Project has utility
measured on the right vertical pole. That utility incorporates enhanced employment
opportunities, greater access to role models, and whatever other residual benefits flow
from having a Properly Purposed Project.
Across the bottom horizontally left to right is the increase in Properly Purposed
Projects. The horizontal line titled EU tracts the increase or decrease in the Ethnivestor
utility as each project is built with investor funds. The horizontal line titled TRU tracts
the increase or decrease target resident utility as each project is built. The horizontal line
titled “B” is the baseline to indicate the lower existing utility of the target resident prior to
each of the development of each of the three projects. Since the Ethnivestor motivations
includes a blend of financial profit and social well being for the ethnic enclave, the
measured increase or decrease in utility as projects are built should also be measured
against those variables.
Obviously it is difficult to quantify the extent of intangible benefits. It should be
sufficient to employ the neoclassical assumption that the investor is rational in
determining what opportunity costs he is willing to forgo, much like someone who pays
more for an antique vase than any other bidder in an auction. The value is measured by
what he is willing to pay. We assume the total of social and profits forgone are included
in his analysis of what to pay. Appraisers have developed methods to separate from a
price paid for a business the intangible assets such as copyrights, patents, and accounts
receivable from the hard assets of plant and machinery. I have every faith that appraisers
can formulate models for separating other forms of intangible assets as well. But to
293 Under Posner, the opportunity cost springs from the bedrock assumption that a rational actor seeks to
maximize self interest, and that a social cost diminishes wealth in society, while a private cost merely
rearranges that wealth. See discussion, supra n. 270. at 17.
294 The Target Resident is consistent with the NMTC statutory definition of “target population” found
within I.R.C. § 45D.
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satisfy the economists’ scientific urges, the conceptual model is that there is a baseline
representing the extent of resident utility existing prior to the enhancement from the
Properly Purposed Project. As noted, that baseline is horizontal line B.
Area A represents the total increase in utility for the Target Resident, i.e. the
amount of increased utility between where he was in utility prior to the project compared
to where he was after each project. Notice that there should be some increased utility
after each project assuming it provides the benefits contemplated in the needs assessment
for the target population. Area B depicts the Ethnivestor utility, which includes both the
extent of value and satisfaction received from seeing increased well being in Target
Residents and the financial return on the investment. In this graph, the amount of
satisfaction the Ethnivestor receives from the social enhancement to the Target Resident
is assumed to be less than the satisfaction received by the Target Resident. This is based
on the reciprocal notion embedded in the concept of diminishing marginal utility that a
pauper will value receipt of say a $10,000 dollar job from a well-healed Ethnivestor more
than that Ethnivestor’s satisfaction from the increased incremental income and
thanksgiving for the joy or return from the pauper/Resident Assistant. That could
obviously be reversed where a wealthy person values most his gift through seeing the joy
it brings. That is the essence of philanthropy. For purposes of illustration however I posit
the circumstance where the combined benefits in utility to the Ethnivestor are less than
the utility to the Target Resident. The point remains the same -as long as the
Ethnivestor’s total utility is a net plus to him, (i.e. the investment benefits, both social and
financial, exceed the forgone opportunity costs of time, alternate investments, etc) there
is increased efficiency.
If the Ethnivestor loses faith in the project or cares less about enhancing the ethnic
enclave and its residents, the utility drops. This would be evidenced by a selling the
investment because in his formulation the marginal utility decline reached a critical net
loss level. Even in the success model, there is some assumed leveling of utility for the
Ethnivestor after the third project. The assumption is that after a certain number of
investments, more of the same bring a diminished marginal utility. Yet as long as
substantial part of the value of the investment is viewed as the social entrepreneurial
benefit, the investment can continue to be an added efficiency to the enclave and the
Ethnivestor.
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Chart B represents the tracing of utility and efficiency for the Gentrifier Investor.
(“G.I.”) The guideposts are the same as for the Ethnivestor in Chart A. But instead of
parallel benefits between the G.I. and the Target Resident, the respective utility to the
parties grow further apart over time. The Target Resident may receive roughly the same
sense of satisfaction, though highly questionable if the investor does not have a personal
commitment to the well being of the target community. Even assuming efficiency
equivalence there is a probable loss of utility and efficiency from the G.I. An investor
that defines maximization of self interest in purely individual financial terms without a
corresponding value for the non-financial benefits to the target resident and ethnic
enclave would likely grow increasingly dissatisfied with the investment. That again
assumes the MMTC statute and regulations require a Properly Purposed Project designed
for long term benefits to the existing target community and residents. Under those
circumstances the G.I. investor is likely to bring lesser efficiency in an economic sense
and greater social costs because utility seepage occurs from the transfer of resources. As
to personal utility, he could have invested in some other venture that was not hindered by
social returns. The commodity of time and related resource losses are greater than the
return.
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In a more macro view of utility and efficiency, there are opportunity costs that
span various entities in a Gentrified project, governmental as well as private. As
described in Section 1, Part III of this article, opportunity costs of gentrified NMTC
projects are substantial, and no different fundamentally than what has been observed as
the byproduct of other gentrified urban redevelopment programs.295
Despite attempts to explain behavior in economic terms, the issue should still be
raised: Does the neo-economic theory advocate or reject the use of utilitarian ideals to
help achieve social justice? If Posner is the voice box for neoclassical economics, the
answer appears to be that achieving social justice is not a goal, only an incidental
byproduct in route to finding an individual’s self interest. Posner finds the notion of the
“sacrifice of innocents for the sake of the greater good…deeply disquieting”.296 Yet,
Posner readily admits that societal decisions of what is just and legal does not always
hinge on economics, as when we make illegal private forms of discrimination based on
race or sex. In his words, “…there is more to justice than economics…”297 On that point
perhaps all scholars can agree.
But the Posner abhorrence for sacrificing oneself for the greater good of a group
may be ameliorated by his concept of “utilitarianism”. On the one hand Posner ties
utility to wealth. In response to his own rhetorical question of how utilitarianism can be
defended, he stated: “One answer is that the things that make wealth possible – not only
or mainly luxury goods, but leisure, comfort, modern medicine, and opportunities for
self-expression and self-realization – are major ingredients of most people’s happiness, so
that wealth maximization is instrumental to utility maximization. This answer ties
295 Quinones, supra n. 59, at 724-751.
296 Posner supra n. 270, at 27. Posner has various definitions of justice. Distributive justice appears as the
one he referenced in the text quotation. Even that term he defines as “the proper degree of economic
equality.”
297 Id. at 28.
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efficiency to utilitarianism.”298 It may be the case that “most people’s” happiness is tied
to self. But the Ethnivestor model is a narrow class where pecuniary self-sacrifice may
be part of the investment motivation in the NMTC program. The scales of influence tip
toward the greater socioeconomic goal of revitalizing urban America without
marginalizing its urban low income residents. It modifies the neoclassical economic
concept of utility and efficiency to incorporate such a goal.
The modification is not entirely inconsistent with the Posner utility model at its
root. Posner has chastised critics of neo-classical economics for improperly viewing
economics as being just about the money. Posner admitted the confusion could easily
occur. His bedrock assumption is that a person is a “rational maximizer of his self-
interest”. 299 This could lead a reasonable thinker to equate self interest with increased
“wealth” in pecuniary terms. To avoid that assumption, Posner prefers to use a more
precise term “utility” to describe a broader concept of “self interest”. Utility is broad
enough a term to include, as Poser states, “a rational utility maximizer in all areas of life,
not just in his ‘economic affairs’.” Posner considers this assumption as “central” to his
entire neo-classical design. 300
Thus, an Ethnivestor’s motivation falls within traditional utility theory. The goal
is not just about money, but a combination of social and financial goals. It is still
maximizing self interest because self interest is broader than mere financial gain. More
precisely, an Ethnivestor has a mix of motivations, both philanthropic and profit driven is
how he envisions “value” and “satisfaction” for the utility of the investment behavior.
Regardless of whether it fits neatly into neoclassical definitions of utility, this Ethnivestor
model should be viewed as a viable theoretical construct for increasing private equity
funds from a previously under-committed source for a socially just goal. The Ethnivestor
includes in his individual investing behavior the notion that the greater good is part of his
satisfaction and value.
298 Id. at 16.
299 Posner supra n. 82, at 4.
300 Id.
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Part IV
Application of Ethnivestor Model
There are various outcomes that can be envisioned from infusion of the
Ethnivestor into the NMTC transactions. Like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
outcomes need to achievable and measurable. The prior Section of this article calls for
empirical analysis of the model, but the theoretical basis is nonetheless grounded in prior
research, just applied to different circumstances.
Reduced Barriers of Entry
One threshold task prior to examining specific Ethnivestor criteria is to establish a
more investment compatible environment under the NMTC program. There appears to be
less than five African American owned CDEs among all the Allocatees granted in the
several years of the program’s existence.301 One barrier to more African American CDEs
is the same that hinders minority entrepreneurship is general – a lack of access to capital.
The current NMTC program has allowed the large scale projects in the range of $100
million and beyond. The majority of them are within the listing of Problematic Purposed
Projects described earlier. Without the money for large scale projects, minority group
CDE participation is practically non-existent. Practically all of the Problematic Purposed
Projects are among the most expensive to build, in large part, it seems because the
purpose is to satisfy those accustomed to more expensive life styles – the gentrifiers
rather than the basic needs of the low income target population. The types of projects the
target community/ethnic enclaves appear to need the most are not the most expensive.
Rather, the Properly Purposed Projects,302 designed for such items as nonconventional
financing for small business start ups, heath care facilities, are and affordable housing are
among the lesser cost projects. If a needs assessment of the statutory “target population”
were primary when formulating the project, and part of the CDFI prioritized criteria,
there is likely to be even smaller sized projects that can accommodate small business
capitalization. The smaller projects should open the investment opportunity to those with
a comparative cultural advantages discussed above. That would be a component to the
strategy that may help return these current NMTC target communities to bustling ethnic
enclaves economies which people like W.E.B. Dubois considered at the very center of the
community. Various other attributes of the Ethnivestor common to the self help heyday
would have to exist as well, and will be discussed below.
Another method of reducing barriers of entry for an Ethnivestor is to reduce the
transactional costs for a NMTC transaction. One important byproduct of the small
business Properly Purposed Projects is that it cures an existing barrier of entry for
Ethnivestors in NMTC projects. Currently, the transactional costs and professional fees
for a NMTC transaction is problematically high, 303 and in many cases prohibitive of the
301 Two hundred thirty three CDEs have received allocations as of June 29, 2006 according to CDFI
announcements on its website at www.cdfi.gov. The CDFI has published profiles of the CDEs that
received awards. Three appear on that list as list as “minority owned or minority controlled”.
302 A more expansive description of such projects is noted in Table C. These were termed a “Mall of
Needs” as a conceptual analogy to a physical strip mall of what items the community needs most.
303 These are professional fees, typically top heavy with billed legal, accounting, and financial consulting
fees. The complicated structures to meet investor risk and reward expectations have been “vastly time
consuming” causing investors to incur a “disproportionate amount of transaction costs” to close the deals.
Brad Elphick, NMTC Issues and Concerns Determine How Investors are Putting Together Deals, NMTC
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types of cases that a target community wants and deserves. 304 The costs are high because
the transactions are highly complex. The transactions are complex because they are
attempting to meet gentrified goals, (i.e. a substantial return on the investment of
problematic purposed projects). Some projects have hundreds of millions of dollars in
construction costs.305 If the goals were aligned with the best interests of the target
community, absent gentrified goals, the projects would not have to be as expensive. The
transactions could be simplified to meet the more basic needs of the target community,
and therefore the transactional costs would decrease proportionally.
Reduced Marginalization Through
Small Business Modeling
The Ethnivestor model attempts to incorporate the successful self help criteria that
were historically successful for African American ethnic enclaves and others prior to the
Civil Rights focus on integration in the 1960s. That model includes small business
formations, hiring within the ethnic business class, and using the business as a training
ground to grow entrepreneurial education and experience from within.
As to small business formations, the Ethnivestor investment motives are aligned
to the Weber model of self help formations in response to hostility from the host society
because of its strong ethnic influence of decision making (horizontally evidenced to the
far right of the grid). A lack of access to capital has been a major hurdle to establishment
of the enterprises among the low income communities. The ethnic response historically
was to establish an ethnic economy where revolving credit associations formed to provide
the capital for its own businesses. The credit association is a collection of funds that are
then distributed to one business owner, and upon re-pooling of additional funds, rotated
to the next business.306 Consistent with the Weber model, those credit associations were a
self help response to the host society’s hostility (discriminatory lending practices). 307
The credit association strategy is essentially a finance technique with modern
application. Venture capitalists created pooled funds for different tiers of investor types.
Monthly Report, Vol III, Issue VIII, Novograda & Company LLP 2 (2004). One CDE official stated other
allocates “are needing as much as 10-14% of their QEI to cover fees.” Confidential comments from
author’s survey.
304 In New York City, nearly 75% of the public school enrollments are African American and Hispanic and
generally noncompetitive with suburban schools. In 1970, when a significant percentage of students in that
school system were white, 400 doctors were present to address health care needs of those school children.
But 1993, the number of doctors was down to 23, mostly part time – mostly affecting the city’s poorest
neighborhoods were health issues were most extreme. See Kozol, supra n. 203. Needless to say,
educational health care choices and improvements are being demanded in New York and similarly situated
major cities. Some NMTC projects have been charter schools. Some have been health care facilities. None
require the $100 million allocations that give rise to convention center/hotel complexes, and that drive
transactional costs to problematic levels.
305 See the Louisville, Kentucky Marriott hotel and convention center example, supra n. 63.
306 Id at 12. One of the many fertile Boston studies observed that among Kiroean and West Indian enclaves,
the men contributed to the pool, but the women were the bankers, who handled and managed the funds. Id
at 12.
307 The United States Depart of Treasury has found disproportionate predatory lending practices or simply
the failure to loan to minorities who have similar lending credit risks as non-minorities. U.S. Department of
the Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report,” June 2000. See also predatory lending discussion supra n. 278.
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One form of entity that has utilized pooled funds is a limited partnership with a corporate
general partner. Such a model is used by one of the few minority firm participants in the
NMTC program.308
Increased Co-ethnic Employment
The Ethnivestor model also reduces the marginalization by increasing
employment among co-ethnics, including the chronically underemployed African
American male youth. Leading scholars in ethnic economic research concluded that those
who are employed in the ethnic economy are more likely than others to become self
employed. 309 Those small businesses therefore became a self help defacto “school for
entrepreneurs” though different ethnic groups had varied patterns, niche business types,
“all stem from the initial exposure to the ethnic economy…springboards to future
rewards, both economic and social… [i.e. a multiplier effect]”.310 This model increases
the employment opportunities for those underemployed within the NMTC target
population beyond a trickle down gentrification.311 The trickle down theory embodies the
notion that greater investment will lead to significant job growth. As one study
concluded the causal connection between capital investment and job growth among the
low income residents is “untested and usually unproven”. 312 Conversely, there is ample
empirical evidence that redevelopment project areas normally become “gentrifying
markets” without material increase in the quality of life of the low income residents.313
To be effective at employing that chronically underemployed group realistically requires
meeting them where they are in the employment spectrum. It does little good to offer jobs
requiring a graduate degree in economics to those who are struggling with high school
graduation requirements. It is of greater value to establish the types of businesses where
those unemployed youth can be nurtured from those culturally connected role models in
their own “school for entrepreneurs” in the tradition of other ethnic enclave economies.
Long Term Commitment to Target Community
Another criterion for the Ethnivestor is willingness for long term commitment to
the target community, beyond the 7 year tax credit. The desire for long term commitment
rather than mere short term gain is advocated as criteria for the Ethnivestor because it
should provide longer term benefits for the target community, and thus a more qualitative
use of the federal subsidy funds. While a NMTC project has tax credits spread over 7
years, if the CDE fails to establish a permanent economic base after the 7 years, those left
after the tax credit exodus are potentially left flailing as they were prior to the NMTC
project. That would represent an inefficient use of taxpayer dollars. Accordingly, the
308 One of the Round IV allocatees was a limited liability limited partnership with a corporate general
partner. A minority firm organized as a limited liability company was part of the LLLP. See CDE Profiles
available at http://www.cdfi.gov.
309 Halter, supra n. 178, at 9-10.
310 Halter, supra n. 178, at 9-10.
311 The trickle down theory as applied to NMTC transactions is discussed in greater detail, supra in Section
1, Part II.
312 Id at 746, citing Mier, supra n. 77, at 34.
313 Quinones, supra n. 59, at 748. A multitude of commentators suggest even more broadly that “we know
very little about the success of community redevelopment efforts…After several years in operation, the
federal government still cannot even determine with any certainty whether past programs have succeeded;
their design have the government little incentive to evaluate performance.” Pappas, supra n. 124, at 337.
The author opines that the NMTCs provide an opportunity for “drastic improvement” but considers
important the need to hold allocates and the Treasury accountable so results can be measured. Id.
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Ethnivestor model is conceptually not just a tool for current earnings or short term
investment, but a platform - a spring board for future generations of those residents to rise
to a more qualitative life over the long term. In essence, the model is to have investors
with a goal beyond a short term return on investment, to grow the target community. The
result should aid in the quest to establish current and future generations from within
rather than being marginalized by those from outside. The outside gentrification model
has as a more likely byproduct of small benefits to the target residents trickled down from
the gentrified wealthy who build problematic purposed projects. The long term
commitment should flow from the Ethnivestor’s investment motivation to serve the social
entrepreneurial mission, to gain the type of solidarity African Americans of the prior
generations exhibited.
To facilitate an Ethnivestor’s long term commitment, the type of entity for the
CDE and a QCB should be highly flexible. The entities should be flexible enough to
increase continuity between entities both during volatile periods during the 7 year credit
period, and after the credit period when the entities continue the business activity. The
volatile transactional potential exists because there have only been questionable
monitoring of the successes and failures of such ventures.314 So there is very little
empirical of the success or failures under this program from which to establish a best
practices guide or roadmap as to the best designed and effective business types under this
NMTC scheme. It is like a stock market with no Morningstar, a bond without Moody’s.
Regarding continued business activity after the 7-year credit haven, the CDE could
become an equity owner in the QCB during the 7-year credit period and thereafter. Thus,
retaining flexibility and continuity between entities can provide increased options for
structuring future relationships between the CDE and QCB, both of which may be well
stocked with Ethnivestors during or after the 7-year tax credit period. 315
When structuring for long term commitments in a volatile or uncertain
marketplace, some entity types have advantages over others. 316 Limited liability
companies generally provide greater ability of the LLC to negotiate and contract the
relative liability rights between partners over the more rigid requirements of
corporations.317
More challenging may be the need to have an organized business synergy that
serves the local ethnic needs and/or the general public. It is certainly conceivable that,
like Miami entrepreneurs of Cuban descent, an Ethnivestor-based CDE and QCB team
can develop strategic plans that evidence vertical and horizontal integration, culturally
aligned suppliers and consumers and pooled savings, cross-pollinating markets where
related markets become co-referral sources. There is also no prohibition in the NMTC
314 Several commentators have observed that very little is known about the success rates of the program.
Dimitri Pappas, supra n. 124, at 326.
315 Under specified conditions, the CDE many gain majority control, through voting or management rights.
See Reg. § 1.45D-1(d) (6); 69 FED. REG. 77633 (December 28, 2004).
316 For a discussion of the LLC advantages over other business entities, see 95 MICH L REV. 393,446
(1996). An LLC model is often particularly well suited for CDE and the QCD relationship, including the
flexibility of sharing profits, losses, and even partners within the transactions.
317 Consideration should be also given to a modified venture capital limited partnership model, with a
corporate general partner. See Joseph W. Bartlett, Equity Finance, Venture Capital, Buyouts,
Restructurings and Reorganizations 7 (VOL. 1, 2nd ed. 1995).
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statue or Regulations against rotating credit associations akin to those used in other ethnic
enclave economies in this country.
Empirical Ethnographic Design Modeling
Scientific testing of the Ethnivestor model is recommended though beyond the
scope of this article. Ethnography is a scientific approach to discover what people
actually do, what role, if any, culture and ethnicity have to with those actions, and the
reasons for those actions before interpretations are drawn from our professional or
academic discipline.318 Commonly used research methods for ethnographies include data
collection through focus group interviews, audio and video recordings, and elicitation
techniques.319 Definitions on such terms as culture and ethnicity should be clarified.320
The inquiries could for example survey two groups of African Americans: One group that
fits the proposed profile of an Ethnivestor and another group that does not. The questions
would be designed to reveal the likelihood of investing in what is proposed as Properly
Purposed Projects based on the Mall of Needs criteria. If those fitting the Ethnivestor
profile have a highly correlated answer to match the projected investment behaviors in
Properly Purposed Projects then the results are indicia of validity for the model. If, on the
other hand, the non-Ethnivestor profiles show a propensity for investing in those same
proper projects, then the results are indicia that the Ethnivestor model is flawed.
Criterion should include what the would-be investor considers her opportunity
costs and the value of the ethnic group relative to regulator influences. Data can also be
collected through interviews or hypothetical examinations from developers to determine
the point at which the investor considered the opportunity costs to be greater than the
utility of the investment. Groups of the Target Residents that are part of communities
affected by NMTC projects could also be examined to ascertain whether the projects
added to their quality of life. That may provide a basis of comparison for the small
business model in the Ethnivestor construct to test the notion of a modern day ethnic
enclave economy. Have the Properly Purposed Projects already provided empirical
evidence that target residents are indeed co-ethnically employed where the Ethnivestor-
based employer operates a defacto school of entrepreneurship? Are target residents
experiencing an enhanced well being from ethnic role models that passes along positive
modeling for their offspring? Can a body of evidence be developed on the rate of
decrease in the Target Resident’s dependence on public funds under the Ethnivestor and
Gentrifier models? These are but a few of the questions that are part of a larger
ethnography study.
318 LeCompte, n. 175, at 1.
319 Id. at 127.
320 See the definition for ethnicity used in this article in the text associated with note 85.
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Conclusion
The NMTC program has laudable goals of providing federally funded subsidies as
incentives for equity investment to assist targeted low income residents and their
community. The subsidy was created to ameliorate a crisis in America – a crisis that
affects us all. Unintended loopholes have morphed properly purposed projects into more
problematic venues for opera, ballet, symphony orchestras, hotel and convention center
complexes, and high priced condominiums, in two words - subsidized gentrification. This
has occurred in part due to a lack of conceptual clarity on a required relationship between
Means Team and End Project, where each participant in the NMTC transaction is merely
a conduit for delivery of a product primarily designed for the low income residents, rather
than the financially well healed migrants to that community. The lack of conceptual
clarity led to statutory ambiguity as to the precise intended beneficiaries of the program.
And as a result, the NMTC program continues to incur staggering opportunity costs and a
wasting of resources within the community and the dollars earmarked to assist them.321
Various amendments are proposed to provide the CDFI with additional
transactional controls. Principal recommendations include narrowing the type of projects
authorized so only those well designed to meet established needs of the community
receive the subsidy. A model that first establishes the two-pronged outcome (End Sum
Interests, i.e. a Mall of Needs assessment, and a project to meet those needs) should
systematically weed out the Problematic Purposed Projects. There should also be
increased accountability in capital structure to minimize potential overleveraging of the
QCBs. That should also increase long term equity commitments and business operations
beyond the 7 year tax credit haven. A model for revitalization should incorporate long
term activity and this model is consistent with long term planning.
But this article does not merely complain about federal government failures.
Instead it offers an alternative of greater long term support from the private sector to play
a greater role in solving the urban crisis. Through the modeling an Ethnivestor from the
African American middle class, I hope seeds have been planted for future self help
techniques using cultural connectivity as an asset not a demerit. They need not start from
scratch. Rather, lessons can be learned from the entrepreneurship of prior generations and
other immigrants who also faced hostility and exclusion, and who nonetheless formed
vertically and horizontally hyper-efficient ethnic economies, armed with such devices as
rotating credit unions and internal institution-building. These middle class functionaries
of ethnic enclave economies established a trusting nurturing role within their respective
small businesses for their otherwise marginalized co-ethnics. Modern day Ethnivestors
who learn those lessons can help redirect billions of federal tax dollars to the intended
beneficiaries.
This analysis also seeks to incorporate traditional and more contemporary
concepts of law and economics. The intent is that an Ethnivestor’s cultural connectivity
with an ethnic enclave will increase the economic utility of both the investor and the
target residents at a rate greater than investors who do not share that connectivity. The
target resident’s utility can be increased in several ways, including a greater likelihood of
long term employment among the community’s underemployed. Ethnivestors, more
321 See discussion of opportunity costs imposed on low income residents from failed trickle down urban
redevelopment, which is in effect gentrification, at Part II.
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likely committed to the community long term, can increase role modeling, and enhance
use of the small business as a defacto school of entrepreneurship. Then, like the Atlanta
of old where African American businesses thrived without City contracts, modern
Ethnivestor-based businesses do their part to revitalize the community.
These may be unprecedented ways to meet the urban crisis, but the crisis is
reaching unprecedented levels. The status quo brings more of the same, and more of the
same does not solve the urban core issues sought to be remedied through the NMTC
program. If the federal government is to provide tax subsidies to influence investment
behavior in urban America, it is wiser tax policy to retain fundamental tax principles, and
refuse to provide tax benefits for the consumptive wants of gentrifiers, when needs of
crisis proportions remain unmet. That diversion of funds and dilution of purpose only
adds to the marginalization and ultimate cost to our society in lost social capital.
We are to be reminded that the tax subsidy is a benefit paid for with taxpayer’s
dollars that comes with a price. That price may the foregone opportunity of a maximized
rate of return in a purely private transaction with purely private funds in play. But the
NMTC program involves public funds that therefore should tie primarily to a public
purpose. That purpose is the revitalization of the low income community without
marginalizing the low income residents.
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Table A 
CDE
(For profit only)
CDFI Fund
Private
Investor
Investing in
or lending to
QCB
Financial
Counseling
Investing in
or
Lending to CDEs
Purchasing loans
From CDEs
CDEs must make QLICIs
within 12 months of receipt
of investor QEIs
CDEs must offer credits
To investors within 5 years
QEI must stay
invested for 7 years
*Figure taken from CDFI Fund NMTC Information Session Handout
NMTC Summary Graphic*
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TABLE B
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF PROBLEMATIC PURPOSED PROJECTS
CDE Proposed Use
Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)
Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)
Allocation
Award Year
National Trust
Community
Investment
Corporation
Received 6th largest allocation.
Center for the Arts: Transform the abandoned
factory into museum space for its world-class
contemporary art collection. Following a $30
million rehabilitation, this 292,000 square-foot
industrial steel, concrete and glass structure is
now home to one of the world’s foremost
collections of works by major artists of the 1960s
and 1970s, including Andy Warhol, Joseph
Beuys, Walter De Maria and Donald Judd.
Hippodrome Performing Arts Center: Restore
three historic landmark buildings. The distinctive
exterior cornice and marquee of the original
Hippodrome Theater will be recreated. The 2,250-
seat center anticipates hosting 200 events a year,
including the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra and
touring Broadway production.
Portland Telegram Building: Includes restoration
of the façade and clock tower and renovation of
33,000 square-feet of space for retail and office
use.
Professional Building: Upper floor offices and
ground floor retail.
Historic Tennessee Theatre: Rehabilitation of the
‘Official State Theatre of Tennessee,’ a 1928
movie palace in downtown Knoxville.
American Tobacco Historic District:
Rehabilitation…into a mixed-use complex, and
4,000-seat theatre.
$127 $49.53 2002
123 New
Market
Investors, LLC
226-room hotel in downtown Washington, D.C. $13 $5.07 2002
Louisville
Development
Bancorp, Inc.
Redevelopment of Broadway
Cinemas…development of the Marriott
Convention Hotel…development of Residence Inn
Downtown…construction of a new headquarters
building for CW Johnson Xpress.
$8 $3.12 2005
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CDE Proposed Use
Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)
Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)
Allocation
Award Year
Phoenix
Community
Development
and Investment
Corporation
A biotechnology campus. $170 $66.3 2002
Michigan
Magnet Fund
ICCF Project-Grand Rapids: 5,000 square feet of
commercial space.
Lot 9-Kalamazoo: 113,000 square feet mixed-use
building comprised of 10,000 square feet retail,
48,606 Class A Office and 16,800 square feet of
residential housing.
Pere Marquette Depot: $3.8 million building will be
the regional tourism bureau center.
1 South Division-Grand Rapids: 40,000 square
feet of retail space and 149 public parking spaces.
Stadium Project-Lansing: Mixed-use development
with first floor retail/office use consisting of 25,000
square feet…36 urban rental units…$800-$1,200
per month.
500 Block-Flint: $11 million 30,000 square foot
restaurant and entertainment complex. Eight loft
apartments…1,500 sq. ft. to 3,000 sq. ft.
$60 $23.4 2005
Historic
Rehabilitation
Fund I
Rehabilitation of the old Portland Armory for the
Portland Center Stage.
“Intent is to transform Portland’s historic, but
unused, Armory building into a world-class
performing arts center. This allows Portland
Center Stage to move out of its current home into
a performance space better suited to its goal of
becoming a top American regional theater
company.”
$24 $9.36 2003
Johnson
Community
Development
Company
$4 million to fund a newly constructed office
building, Deer Valley Corporate Center.
Assist The Stockyards Restaurant, a virtual living
museum and local landmark that commemorates
and celebrates Arizona’s cattle industry.
Loans have funded improvements for…world
headquarters for a medical systems company.
$52 $20.28 2003
Seattle
Community
Investments
60,000 square feet of retail space and 100
apartment units on a four-acre site…transforming
High Point from a blighted concentration of low-
income people into a new, ecologically
sustainable, mixed-income community.
$20 $7.8 2006
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CDE Proposed Use
Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)
Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)
Allocation
Award Year
Urban
Research Park
CDE, LLC
Research parks…universities, colleges, hospitals,
medical schools, and research parks. $50 $19.5 2006
Affirmative New
Markets, LLC
Bring “real life” to a community. Boston Medical
Center to rehabilitate an historic building on its
campus…to house its information Technology
Group.
$12 $4.68 2003
The
Association for
Theater-Based
Community
Development
The purchase and rehabilitation of theaters $6 $2.34 2002
Border
Communities
Capital
Company, LLC
Office, industrial, tourist, commercial and
residential development projects $50 $19.5 2002
Cahaba
Community
Development,
LLC
Lofts…retail and office space, a multi-story
parking structure. $40 $15.6 2002
Campus
Partners for
Community
Urban
Development
Large mixed-use facility (including retail, office
and residential components as well as parking
facilities)
$35 $13.65 2002
Clearinghouse
CDFI
$15 million shopping and cultural center in San
Diego called Market Creek Plaza. Amphitheater
for special events.
$56 $10.14 2002
Local Initiatives
Support
Corporation
(LISC)
60,000 square-foot mixed-use real estate
projects…saves historic mill…by rehabilitating
and expanding the existing structure into
residential and commercial space. The project will
house art galleries…wine bar/coffee shop…also
include 36 residential lofts.
Another project: third floor ballroom will be
used…for studio, office and performance space
for itself and other puppet artists…project begun
16 years ago when HOBT renovated the Avalon
Theatre.
Rehab of former industrial buildings in Milwaukee
suburb: high quality office building…500,000
square-feet of office and parking space.
$10.8 $4.21 2002
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CDE Proposed Use
Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)
Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)
Allocation
Award Year
MHIC, LLC
Retail and office space, theaters and performing
arts centers.
New 20,000 square-foot, 4-story office
condominium building.
High quality and attractive commercial space and
housing.
Performance center, office and retail space.
Lofts.
$25 $9.75 2002
Greater
Jamaica Local
Development
Company, Inc.
14-story office building…office space, ground floor
retail. $21 $8.19 2002
Impact
Community
Capital CDE,
LLC
Commercial real estate projects. 40% of its
activities will be targeted to suburban areas. $40 $15.6 2002
Phoenix
Community
Development
and Investment
Corporation
Retail development and hotel projects…mixed-
use commercial facilities…a biotechnology
campus.
$170 $66.3 2002
REI New
Markets
Investment,
LLC
30,000 square-foot state-of-the-art manufacturing
plant at the Presbyterian Health Foundation (PHF)
Research Park.
Cytovance Biologics, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical
contract manufacturing company specializing in
the production of therapeutic proteins and
antibodies from mammalian cell culture.
$80 $31.2 2002
Southeast
Indiana
Community
Development
Hotel…theater…medical arts center $3 $1.17 2002
Coastal
Enterprises,
Inc.
GMRI marine research/education laboratory.
First-class commercial/office space.
$64 $24.96 2003
Harbor
Bankshares
Corporation
The housing and business infrastructure relating
to the development of an $800 million bio-tech
park.
A commercial loan fund to finance large scale
mixed-use projects.
$50 $19.5 2003
Hospitality
Fund I
Restore historic retail center of Portland’s
downtown for mixed-use…Premium hotel rooms. $72.5 $28.28 2003
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CDE Proposed Use
Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)
Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)
Allocation
Award Year
Massachusetts
Housing
Investment
Corporation
Office and retail space, theatres and performing
arts centers. $90 $35.1 2003
Northeast Ohio
Development
Fund, LLC
Enhance or improve upon the current activity of
the Cleveland-Cuyahoga County Port Authority. $47 $18.33 2003
Prestamos,
CDFI, LLC
Community retail projects, commercial/industrial
development…equity funding for companies in the
life sciences and technology industry.
$15 $5.85 2003
Southside
Development
Enterprises,
LLC
$15 million will go toward attracting national
retailers to the former Mid City Shopping
Center…attract office and commercial
development to …Business Park.
$21 $8.19 2003
Wisconsin
Community
Development
Legacy Fund,
Inc.
Finance construction of a nine-story office
building. $100 $39 2003
Biotech
Research
Center, LLC
Help finance development of a 300,000 square
foot life sciences research facility next to the new
University of Hawaii medical school.
$28 $10.92 2005
Local Initiatives
Support
Corporation
$65 million for mixed-use property that includes
commercial space and 36 loft apartments.
Sophisticated office complex…with 500,000
square feet of office and parking spaces…Many
of the tenants will be in the high tech or medical
services sectors.
$90 $35.1 2005
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TABLE C
PROPERLY PURPOSED PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
Below is a sampling of project descriptions that are considered well designed for target
community needs determinations and thus Properly Purposed Projects. The term Properly
Purposed Projects is also an apt label.
 “Community healthcare centers”
 “Small Business Development”
 “Nontraditional financing to support businesses located in low income areas”
 “Child care, Head Start and other non-profit facilities”
 “Real estate financing to small businesses, non-profit community centers, day
care centers, charter schools, food distributors, health and social service
centers…”
 “Projects …designed to be more affordable to end users, so that businesses can
remain in the low income communities”
 “Facilities - enhance access for charter schools in distressed areas”
 “Economic development to Hispanic Latino communities…originate debt
investments in …nonprofit community organizations.”
 “Working capital loans to community based housing developers, and operators of
community facilities, …and senior centers”
[Source: Round Two CDFI Profiles]
